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THE LEGALITY OF DAILY FANTASY SPORTS IS IN GAMBLE
IN SOME STATES: A CLOSER LOOK AT NEW YORK AND
DELAWARE’S RESPONSE TO THIS NEW(ISH) TREND
I. WHO PUT THE DAILY IN FANTASY SPORTS?
While daily fantasy sports (“DFS”) has gained popularity and
publicity only in recent years, it has been around for nearly a dec-
ade.1  Operating under the radar for quite some time, DFS’s growth
can largely be linked to the emergence and efforts of the now rec-
ognizable “market leaders,” FanDuel and DraftKings, two compa-
nies incorporated in Delaware.2  FanDuel was established in January
2009, whereas DraftKings formed three years later in 2012.3  Al-
though they have competed in the past for the number one
spot, having similar valuations, these titans decided to merge be-
cause of the costs of handling looming issues surrounding the
legality of DFS.4  This Comment explores some of these legal
1. The Evolution of the Daily Fantasy Sports Industry, ROTOGRINDERS, https://
rotogrinders.com/static/daily-fantasy-sports-timeline [https://perma.cc/LJ2W-
RYQ5] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) (“While [DFS] has enjoyed explosive growth
since 2013, the industry’s origins can be traced back more than a decade.  The
concept for DFS was discussed throughout the 2000’s, with the first gaming sites
being founded in 2007.”).
2. See id. (noting how FanDuel and DraftKings have formed business relation-
ships with major sports leagues and corporations, including National Basketball
Association (NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), NBC, and Comcast). See gener-
ally Kirby Garlitos, FanDuel Wins Legal Battle with DraftKings; NFL Imposes Rule on
Fantasy Sports Ads, CALVINAYRE.COM (Mar. 26, 2015), http://calvinayre.com/2015/
03/26/sports/fanduel-wins-legal-battle-with-draftkings-nfl-imposes-rule-on-fantasy-
sports-ads/ [https://perma.cc/ 24U2-DCQ7] (touching quickly on DraftKings’
and FanDuel’s state of incorporation).
3. See The Evolution of the Daily Fantasy Sports Industry, supra note 1 (providing R
timeline).
4. See Dustin Gouker, FanDuel vs DraftKings – Who’s Number 1 in Daily Fantasy?,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (last updated Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.legalsportsreport.
com/3832/fanduel-or-draftkings/ [https://perma.cc/AU8S-6KWG] (comparing
services and operations of FanDuel and DraftKings); Dustin Gouker, DraftKings’
CEO Says Company Has Passed FanDuel for No. 1 in Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS
REP. (Aug. 15, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/3387/draft
kings-leads-fanduel-in-dfs-ceo-says/ [https://perma.cc/3P6Z-3WQV] (detailing
DraftKings’ progress); see also Dustin Gouker, For DraftKings, FanDuel and Daily Fan-
tasy Sports, What a Difference a Year Makes, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 29, 2016, 7:56
AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11240/draftkings-fanduel-dfs-2016/
[https://perma.cc/8BV8-ANTK] (describing other DFS sites and noting how Ya-
hoo! Sports is “clear No. 3”).  FanDuel and DraftKings wanted to merge because
“[l]obbying and legal costs had damaged both companies’ bottom lines.”  Joe
Drape, DraftKings and FanDuel Agree to Merge Daily Fantasy Sports Operations, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/sports/draftkings-
(275)
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issues.5  Moreover, the merger requires federal regulatory approval,
but will likely close in late 2017.6
But what exactly is DFS?7  In contrast to traditional fantasy
sports, which typically last full seasons, DFS contests last anywhere
from one day to two or three days depending on the sport.8  To
participate, individuals create an account on a DFS website and
then deposit money into that account to enter a sports contest of
their choosing—their “entry fee.”9  Participants next create their
own individualized rosters, drafting athletes whose prices vary de-
pending on their real-life professional performance.10  The more
“elite” an athlete is, the higher the athlete’s price will be.11  More
than one person can have the same draft because a participant’s
roster is independent of others’ rosters.12  Generally, there is a sal-
fanduel-merger-fantasy-sports.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9KPR-NYE5] (describ-
ing merger as “one of necessity”); see also Alexandra Berzon, DraftKings and FanDuel
Agree to Merge, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 18, 2016, 2:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/draftkings-and-fanduel-agree-to-merge-1479479405 (noting how both compa-
nies have been having trouble with profitability recently due to “legal and lobbying
bills”).  For further discussion of the difficulties the companies have been facing,
see infra notes 19–92 and accompanying text. R
5. For further discussion of the difficulties the companies have been facing,
see infra notes 19–92 and accompanying text. R
6. See Drape, supra note 4 (clarifying that FanDuel and DraftKings will operate R
independently until deal closes); see also Marc Edelman, Why Antitrust Regulators
Could Block a DraftKings Merger with FanDuel, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2016, 9:29 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2016/10/29/why-antitrust-regulators
-could-block-a-draftkings-merger-with-fanduel/#2cf2f6f65c52 [https://perma.cc/
96AR-RHMS] (indicating regulatory roadblocks merger may face).
7. For a discussion of how DFS works, see infra notes 8–16 and accompanying R
text.
8. See Playing Daily Fantasy Sports for Dummies and er . . . You!, DAILY FANTASY
SPORTS 101, http://www.dailyfantasysports101.com/basics/ [https://perma.cc/
3AAH-J7NT] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) (explaining how DFS contests for baseball
and basketball differ from football).
9. See Zachary Shapiro, Regulation, Prohibition, and Fantasy: The Case of FanDuel,
DraftKings, and Daily Fantasy Sports in New York and Massachusetts, 7 HARV. J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 289, 291 (2016) (giving an overview of DFS); see also DraftKings, 1-Day
Fantasy Sports, DRAFTKINGS, https://www.draftkings.com/ [https://perma.cc/TW5
E-6KP2] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) (prompting site visitors to join); FanDuel Combo
5-Pack, Up to a $50 Value: Play 5 Beginner Contests FREE, FANDUEL, https://www.fan
duel.com/ [https://perma.cc/BB7R-9ZJA] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) (advertising
deal to gain new members).
10. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 291 (describing how DFS sites and contests R
generally work); Ken Belson, A Primer on Daily Fantasy Football Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/sports/football/a-primer-on-
daily-fantasy-football-sites.html [https://perma.cc/VRH4-ZEZ8] (noting that there
are “high-dollar athletes and less expensive ones” and imparting tips for securing
well-performing roster).
11. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 291 (commenting how athletes’ costs vary). R
12. See Playing Daily Fantasy Sports for Dummies and er . . . You!, supra note 8 R
(suggesting no limitation on how contestants may select athletes for their rosters
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ary cap for a DFS contest, “with each user allocated a fixed maxi-
mum budget to spend on athletes for their team.”13  Participants’
teams then gain points depending on how their athletes perform
during games.14  The more points a participant accumulates, the
higher he or she will be on that DFS contest’s leaderboard.15  De-
pending on the contest structure, payout is determined by where a
participant ends up on the leaderboard.16
As DFS has become more and more popular, however, so have
concerns about its legality.17  For much of its lifetime, DFS has been
besides staying within salary cap). But see Rules and Scoring, FANDUEL, https://
www.fanduel.com/rules [https://perma.cc/8D2R-HPLM] (last visited Jan. 20,
2017) (noting that in addition to salary caps, FanDuel imposes “Lineup Restric-
tions” in which gamers must “pick players from at least three different teams” and
“may not pick more than four players from the same team”).  For further discus-
sion of salary caps, see infra note 13 and accompanying text.  DraftKings also re- R
quires that participants make rosters comprised of athletes from different teams
and different “real-life” games. See, e.g., Daily Fantasy Basketball League Rules,
DRAFTKINGS, https://www.draftkings.com/help/nba [https://perma.cc/KW4Y-
MARK] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (providing roster requirements for NBA con-
tests); Daily Fantasy Baseball League Rules, DRAFTKINGS, https://www.draftkings.
com/help/mlb [https://perma.cc/4WDS-PPQV] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (do-
ing same for MLB contests). See also Belson, supra note 10 (explaining that while R
contestants may be tempted to create the same roster of “all-stars,” it may be best to
diversify roster with lesser-priced players to increase winning probability).  Once a
tournament or contest “locks,” a contestant may no longer make changes to his or
her roster. See Playing Daily Fantasy Sports for Dummies and er . . . You!, supra note 8. R
13. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 291; see also Playing Daily Fantasy Sports for Dummies R
and er . . . You!, supra note 8 (clarifying that some DFS contests do not use salary R
cap format); see generally Jason Spry, Salary Caps for Dummies, DAILY FANTASY SPORTS
101 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.dailyfantasysports101.com/salary-caps-for-dum
mies/ [https://perma.cc/Q2WY-RKX2] (providing backgrounds of DFS salary
caps).
14. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 291 (explaining briefly relationship between R
point gain and athletes’ real-life performances).  Athletes, and thereby DFS contes-
tants, earn “‘fantasy points’ for accumulating stats such as yards gained, points
scored, number of catches, number of touchdowns, number of runs batted in, etc.”
Id. at 291 n.6.
15. See Playing Daily Fantasy Sports for Dummies and erFalse You!, supra note 8 R
(noting that DFS site hosting contest will provide and update leaderboard).
16. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 291 (describing types of DFS contests availa- R
ble and how well a contestant must do to receive a prize); see also Jason Spry, Fan-
tasy Football Cash Games vs. GPP Tournaments, DAILY FANTASY SPORTS 101 (Oct. 11,
2016), http://www.dailyfantasysports101.com/fantasy-football-cash-games-vs-gpp-
tournaments/ [https://perma.cc/EP3B-SXUW] (conveying that there are two
broad categories of DFS contests—cash games and guaranteed prize pool tourna-
ments—and strategy to win differs based on type of contest).  For example, in a
“50/50” competition, which falls under the cash game category, contestants who
receive enough points to place in the top half of that competition win back their
entry fee two-fold. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 291 (pointing out that those who R
place in lower half do not get their entry fees back).
17. See, e.g., Joe Drape & Jacqueline Williams, Scandal Erupts in Unregulated
World of Fantasy Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/06/sports/fanduel-draftkings-fantasy-employees-bet-rivals.html [https://per
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unregulated, existing in a legal landscape of ambiguity, where there
has been no clear answer as to whether DFS constitutes gambling.18
However, in October 2015, the landscape drastically changed with
the birth of FanDuel’s and DraftKings’s first scandal.19  It all started
when a DraftKings employee released non-public information relat-
ing to a DraftKings contest.20  The following week, this employee
won $350,000 in a FanDuel National Football League (NFL) con-
test.21  According to DraftKings and FanDuel policies at the time,
“employees were not allowed to compete for money on [their own
employer’s site, but] were allowed to compete on [a competitor’s
site].”22  These events consequently drew sharp criticism, unearth-
ing fears of insider trading and lack of gaming integrity.23  Critics
ma.cc/WM28-MWCQ] (reporting on data scandal implicating DraftKings and
FanDuel and sharing concerns for need to regulate industry); Daniel Roberts, Full
Timeline: The DraftKings/FanDuel Data Scandal, FORTUNE (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:58 PM),
http://fortune.com/2015/10/07/draftkings-fanduel-scandal-timeline/ [https://
perma.cc/D5QA-76PR] (providing timeline of DFS industry controversy and not-
ing how lawmakers thereafter inquired into DFS’s legality); Shapiro, supra note 9, R
at 295–312 (examining legal issues concerning DFS and providing reasons to regu-
late industry).  For further discussion on DraftKings and FanDuel’s “data scandal”
and the consequences, see infra notes 19–31 and accompanying text. R
18. See generally Drape & Williams, supra note 17 (shedding light on industry R
and offering industry analysts’ criticisms).
19. See id. (discussing scandal and raising concerns about insider trading);
Roberts, supra note 17 (compiling timeline of scandal and ramifications). R
20. See Roberts, supra note 17 (explaining that information released was R
posted to DraftKings contest blog and related to “ownership data” (i.e., contes-
tants’ rosters)).  The DraftKings employee quickly retracted the information. See
id. (including DraftKings’s employee response to post).  For further discussion of
the risks of prematurely accessing or releasing this data, see infra note 23 and ac- R
companying text.  Someone noticed the information and posted about it in a
RotoGrinders forum, calling it a “ ‘a big leak.’” See Roberts, supra note 17.  The R
DraftKings employee explained that he had resolved the issue and apologized for
his mistake. See id.  He also underscored how he was not allowed to play in DraftK-
ings contests as a DraftKings employee. See id. (saying nothing about inability to
play on FanDuel).  That policy was changed in light of scandal. See id.; see also
Sarah E. Needleman & Sharon Terlep, FanDuel, DraftKings Ban Employees From Play-
ing Daily Fantasy Contests for Money, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 7, 2015, 7:01 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/fanduel-bans-employees-from-playing-daily-fantasy-contests-
for-money-1444233537 (confirming that DraftKings and FanDuel have “perma-
nently banned employees from playing in daily contests for money”).
21. See Roberts, supra note 17 (commenting on timeline of scandal).  The em- R
ployee placed second overall. See id. (including position).
22. Id. (noting that shortly after both sites began to prohibit their employees
from playing on each other’s sites); see also Needleman & Terlep, supra note 20 R
(limiting ban only to contests involving monetary prizes).
23. See Drape & Williams, supra note 17 (including concerns of DFS analysts). R
If [the employee] had access to DraftKings ownership data before select-
ing his lineup in the FanDuel contest . . . it would have given him the
competitive advantage of knowing which NFL players were likely to not
be selected by many users in the FanDuel contest, since the two sites func-
tion so similarly.
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and fans were concerned about “the extent to which industry em-
ployees should be able to participate in fantasy sports contests on
competitor sites.”24  Privy to this negative attention, the New York
Attorney General’s office commenced investigations into both com-
panies for consumer protection reasons.25  Unfortunately for
DraftKings and FanDuel, this culminated in the New York Attorney
General (“NYAG”), Eric T. Schneiderman, sending cease-and-desist
letters to DraftKings CEO, Jason Robins, and FanDuel CEO, Nigel
Eccles, in November of 2015.26  He stated that DFS operations “con-
Roberts, supra note 17.  DraftKings, however, issued a statement explaining that R
the employee had access to the information only after “FanDuel lineups [were]
locked.” Id. (sharing DraftKings’ statement).  Both companies thereafter also is-
sued a joint statement affirming their commitment to protecting the “integrity of
[their] games” and enforcing policies against employees misusing internal infor-
mation. Id. (releasing statement of Fantasy Sports Trade Association, which de-
fends DFS industry’s interests).
24. Roberts, supra note 17 (quoting Fantasy Sports Trade Association R
statement).
25. See id. (explaining letters, which requested information about whether any
employees won money through other company’s DFS contests). See generally Letter
from Kathleen McGee, Bureau Chief, Division of Economic Justice, Internet Bu-
reau, State of New York Office of the Attorney General, to Nigel Eccles, CEO,
FanDuel, Inc. (Oct. 6, 2015), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/
sports/draftkings-fanduel-inquiry-new-york-attorney-general.html [hereinafter Let-
ter to FanDuel] (listing nine points of inquiry); Letter from Kathleen McGee, Bu-
reau Chief, Division of Economic Justice, Internet Bureau, State of New York
Office of the Attorney General, to Jason Robins, CEO, DraftKings, Inc. (Oct. 6,
2015), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/sports/draftkings-
fanduel-inquiry-new-york-attorney-general.html [hereinafter Letter to DraftKings]
(listing same points of inquiry).  From the outset, both letters also addressed that
they are in in response to “reports indicating that employees or agents of [FanDuel
and DraftKings] . . . have gained an unfair, financial advantage in [DFS contests]
by exploiting their access to nonpublic data.”  Letter to FanDuel, supra; Letter to
DraftKings, supra (alluding to Haskell scandal).  For further discussion of this scan-
dal, see supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. See also Roberts, supra note 17 R
(noting that Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Department of Justice also
commenced investigations into DFS industry about a week after New York Attorney
General’s office).
26. See Louis Bien, DraftKings and FanDuel Ordered to Stop Accepting Bets by New
York Attorney General, SB NATION (Nov. 10, 2015, 7:15 PM), http://www.sbnation.
com/2015/11/10/9708414/draftkings-fanduel-gambling-new-york-attorney-gen
eral-cease-desist-daily-fantasy-sports [https://perma.cc/9REL-9TFV] (reporting
news of Schneiderman’s order, including FanDuel and DraftKings’ responses); No-
tice to Cease and Desist and Notice of Proposed Litigation Pursuant to New York
Executive Law § 63(12) and General Business Law § 349 from Kathleen McGee,
Bureau Chief, Division of Economic Justice, Internet Bureau, State of New York
Office of the Attorney General, to Jason Robins, CEO, DraftKings, Inc. (Nov. 10,
2015) [hereinafter DraftKings Cease-and-Desist Order], available at http://
ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Final_NYAG_DraftKings_Letter_11_10_2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4ZUU-F5ZW] (stating that DraftKings engaged in “illegal gambling” and
providing explanation); Notice to Cease and Desist and Notice of Proposed Litiga-
tion Pursuant to New York Executive Law § 63(12) and General Business Law
§ 349 from Kathleen McGee, Bureau Chief, Division of Economic Justice, Internet
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stitute[ed] illegal gambling” under New York State law and ordered
the sites to “stop accepting wagers” within the state immediately.27
Mr. Schneiderman reasoned that DFS games were “‘contest[s] of
chance’ . . . where winning or losing depend[ed] on numerous ele-
ments of chance to a ‘material degree.’”28  Finding that DraftKings
and FanDuel operations constituted gambling and that the compa-
nies were not otherwise authorized to engage in such activity, Mr.
Schneiderman demanded that both companies “cease and desist
Bureau, State of New York Office of the Attorney General, to Nigel Eccles, CEO,
FanDuel, Inc. (Nov. 10, 2015) [hereinafter FanDuel Cease-and-Desist Order],
available at http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Final_NYAG_FanDuel_Letter_11_10_
2015_signed.pdf  [https://perma.cc/7KWE-W7JD] (stating that FanDuel engaged
in “illegal gambling” and providing explanation); see also Louis Bien, Everything You
Ever Wanted to Know About Daily Fantasy Sports and Why They’re Getting Sued, SB NA-
TION (Nov. 24, 2015, 11:58 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/2015/11/24/97916
08/draftkings-fanduel-daily-fantasy-sports-lawsuit-new-york-internet-gambling
[https://perma.cc/UU7D-96BW] (summarizing NYAG’s legal arguments).  For
further discussion of NYAG’s reasoning, see infra notes 27–29 and accompanying R
text.
27. DraftKings Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 26 (reviewing New York’s R
state law against illegal gambling); FanDuel Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 26; R
A.G. Schneiderman Issues Cease-and-Desist Letters to FanDuel and DraftKings, Demanding
That Companies Stop Accepting Illegal Wagers in New York State, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GEN., ERIC. T. SCHNEIDERMAN (Nov. 11, 2015) [hereinafter NYAG
Press Release], http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-issues-cease-
and-desist-letters-fanduel-and-draftkings-demanding [https://perma.cc/2M2L-
3ELS] (highlighting that NYAG’s conclusions were based upon investigations insti-
tuted month earlier).  For further discussion of these investigations, see supra note
25 and accompanying text.  The press release also highlighted NYAG’s desire to R
correct the perception that DFS is “neither victimless nor harmless.” NYAG Press
Release, supra.
28. DraftKings Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 26; FanDuel Cease-and-De- R
sist Order, supra note 26.  New York Penal Law section 225.00 states R
A person engages in gambling when he stakes or risks something of value
upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent event
not under his control or influence, upon an agreement or understanding
that he will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (McKinney 2015).  For further discussion of New York
Penal Law section 225.00, see infra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. R
Further, a “contest of chance” is defined as “any contest, game, gaming
scheme or gaming device in which the outcome depends in a material degree
upon an element of chance, notwithstanding that skill of the contestants may also be a
factor therein.”  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(1) (McKinney 2015) (emphasis added);
accord Shapiro, supra note 9, at 300–01 (explaining that not much recent  New R
York state case law exists determining what constitutes “material degree” of chance
and also commenting that determination therefore seems to be rather “subjec-
tive”); Jeffrey C. Meehan, The Predominate Goliath: Why Pay-to-Play Daily Fantasy Sports
Are Games of Skill Under the Dominant Factor Test, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 5, 16–17
(2015) (stating that New York employs “Material Element Test”). But see People v.
Li Ai Hua, 885 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2009) (“The test of the character
of the game is not whether it contains an element of chance or an element of skill,
but which is the dominating element that determines the result of the game?”) (em-
phasis added) (quoting People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 755 (N.Y.
1904)).
6
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from illegally accepting wagers in New York State as part of [their]
DFS contests.”29
With news of these events making national headlines, the lime-
light on DFS began to grow in other states as well, prompting gov-
ernment inquiries into this unregulated industry.30  Specifically, in
July 2016, the Delaware Department of Justice warned DraftKings,
FanDuel, and Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo!”) to halt their operations be-
cause DFS was a form of unauthorized gambling and, therefore, was
constitutionally prohibited by the state.31
This Comment explores the differing responses to DFS in New
York and Delaware, including how neither state reacted prudently
to this newish industry.32  Part II provides an overview of the regula-
tory and legislative developments concerning DFS in each of the
29. DraftKings Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 26; FanDuel Cease-and-De- R
sist Order, supra note 26 (discussing N.Y. Penal Law section 225.00 and N.Y. Con- R
stitution article I, section 9, which place restrictions on gambling).  For further
discussion of New York’s legal landscape regarding gambling, see infra notes 40–42 R
and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., The Dark World of Fantasy Sports and Online Gambling, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/news-event/sports-betting-daily-fantasy-games-fanduel-
draftkings [https://perma.cc/F25W-9XJA] (last visited Oct. 18, 2016) (providing
links to dozens of stories on DFS); Joe Drape, Texas Attorney General Deems Daily
Fantasy Sports Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01
/20/sports/texas-attorney-general-deems-daily-fantasy-sports-illegal.html?rref=col
lection%2Fnewseventcollection%2Fsports-betting-daily-fantasy-games-fanduel-
draftkings [https://perma.cc/J6RK-2NPN] (informing readers that Ken Paxton,
Texas Attorney General, concluded that DFS is gambling and illegal under state
law months after NYAG’s decision); see also Sharon Terlep, New York Orders Daily
Fantasy-Sports Companies FanDuel, DraftKings to Cease Operations, WALL STREET J.
(Nov. 10, 2015, 8:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/n-y-attorney-general-tells-
daily-fantasy-sports-companies-to-cease-operations-in-the-state-1447197512 (noting
how NYAG’s cease-and-desist letters were the first time companies were “formally
accused of criminal activity” by committing gambling offenses).
31. See Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, DELA-
WARE.GOV (July 8, 2016), http://news.delaware.gov/2016/07/08/ofs/ [https://
perma.cc/TC6C-5HRC] (“Put simply, current Delaware law does not permit on-
line fantasy sports contests where there is payment required for participation and a
possibility of winning money like those offered by DraftKings, Inc., FanDuel, Inc.,
and Yahoo! Inc.”); Dustin Gouker, DraftKings, FanDuel, Yahoo Get Cease-and-Desist
Letters in Delaware, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (July 8, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://www.legal
sportsreport.com/10679/draftkings-fanduel-yahoo-get-cease-desist-letters-dela
ware/ [https://perma.cc/9G52-67ST] (mentioning that cease-and-desist letters
were sent to the DFS operators and providing overview of Delaware’s constitutional
prohibition).  Yahoo! is a DFS newcomer, beginning DFS operations in 2015. See
Chris Grove, Yahoo Enters Daily Fantasy Sports Market: Impacts and Analysis, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (July 8, 2015, 12:03 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/2152/ya
hoo-enters-daily-fantasy-sports-market/ [https://perma.cc/3VLF-GGCL] (launch-
ing its DFS platform through Yahoo! Sports).
32. For further discussion of the states’ differing approaches, see infra notes
37–167 and accompanying text. R
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states, along with respective legal backdrops.33  Part III discusses a
constitutional shortcoming of New York’s response and suggests
that Delaware implicitly took note when responding to the legal
ambiguity surrounding DFS there.34  It also suggests that so far both
states have responded inadequately in how they have resolved DFS’s
legality or begun to regulate the industry.35  Part IV summarizes
these issues and considers the possibility of some federal
guidance.36
II. STATE RESPONSES TO DFS: A GAME OF SKILL OR A
CONTEST OF CHANCE?
A. New York
1. New York Develops DFS Legislation
After sending cease-and-desist letters to FanDuel and DraftK-
ings, the NYAG moved for preliminary injunctions against both
companies to “enjoin and restrain” their operations in New York
and prohibit them “from accepting entry fees, wagers or bets from
New York consumers in regards to any competition, game or con-
test run” on their websites.37  In December 2015, Justice Manuel
Mendez granted the motions, but shortly thereafter the companies
obtained temporary stays of the injunctions.38  Thus, DraftKings
and FanDuel continued to operate in New York, and the stay was
33. For further discussion of the states’ differing approaches, see infra notes
37–92 and accompanying text. R
34. For further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 93–167 and accom- R
panying text.
35. For further discussion about how the states have ineffectively reacted, see
infra notes 93–167 and accompanying text. R
36. For further discussion of potential next steps, see infra notes 168–192 and R
accompanying text.
37. Trial Order, People v. Fanduel, Inc., No. 453056/15, 2015 WL 8490461, at
*1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015) (noting that cease-and-desist letters were served
one week prior to NYAG’s filing of motions).
38. Trial Order, People v. Fanduel Inc., No. 453056/15, 2016 WL 1134804, at
*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 2016) (citing Motion Decision, Schneiderman v.
FanFuel [sic] Inc. - Schneiderman v. DraftKings Inc., M-6204, 2016 WL 116379
(N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Motion Decision]) (furnishing timeline
of events and noting that stays were granted by Appellate Division); see also Memo-
randum of FanDuel Inc. in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary In-
junction, People v. FanDuel Inc., No. 4530562015, 2015 WL 9320422, at *19, (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Memorandum of FanDuel] (arguing that stay
should be granted because companies would suffer greater harm by interference
in New York’s market if injunctions were granted); Daniel Wallach, New York Daily
Fantasy Sports Court Case May Hinge on Meaning of ‘Future Contingent Event’, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (Dec. 3, 2015, 4:28 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/6653/
new-york-dfs-case-key-argument/ [https://perma.cc/RY2U-YREV] (putting forth
similar argument).
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extended in January 2016, pending an appellate ruling on the mer-
its of the preliminary injunctions originally ordered by Justice
Mendez.39
Justice Mendez ordered the injunctions primarily on his assess-
ment that NYAG had a “greater likelihood of success on the mer-
its.”40  Reviewing the language of the New York State Constitution
on gambling and its corollary statutory definition, he reasoned that
DFS constituted, or at the least, “involve[d] illegal gambling.”41
New York Penal Law section 225.00 states that “[a] person engages
in gambling when he stakes or risks something of value upon the
outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent event not
under his control or influence, upon an agreement or understand-
ing that he [may] receive something of value.”42  Upholding New
York’s public policy against commercialized gambling, Justice Men-
dez determined that a DFS entry fee was likely “something of
value.”43  He then must have implicitly determined that DFS con-
tests constituted either “contests of chance” or that “real-game per-
formance[s] of professional athletes” were “future contingent
events not under [a DFS user’s] control or influence” to satisfy the
remainder of New York Penal Law section 225.00.44  Otherwise, Jus-
39. See Fanduel, 2016 WL 1134804, at *2 (citing Motion Decision, supra note
38) (granting extension); see also Dustin Gouker, FanDuel, DraftKings Can Remain R
Open in New York After Court Grants Stay of Injunction, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 11,
2016, 10:48 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/7222/fanduel-draftkings-can-
stay-open-in-new-york-after-permanent-stay-of-injunction-granted/ [https://
perma.cc/L5A6-3NX7] (noting that FanDuel and DraftKings could continue do-
ing business in New York in light of staying of injunctions).
40. Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *6, *8 (describing factors to consider when
deciding to order or stay preliminary injunction).
41. Id. at *6, *8 (adopting broad interpretations of the statutory and constitu-
tional prohibitions).  The New York Constitution prohibits lotteries and “any other
kind of gambling,” except (1) state-run lotteries, (2) “pari-mutuel betting on horse
races,” and (3) “casino gambling at no more than seven facilities as authorized and
prescribed by the legislature.”  N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.  In addition, the consti-
tution requires that “the legislature . . . pass appropriate laws to prevent offenses
against any of the provisions of this section.” Id. In other words, the legislature
must enforce these gambling prohibitions, not undermine them. See id.
42. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (McKinney 2015).
43. Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *6 (alluding to New York Constitution and
finding that entry fees can be “something of value” under New York Penal Law
section 225.00(2)); accord N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-401 (McKinney 2016) (“All wagers,
bets or stakes, made to depend upon any race, or upon any gaming by lot or
chance, or upon any lot, chance, casualty, or unknown or contingent event
whatever, shall be unlawful.”); Ramesar v. State, 636 N.Y.S.2d 950, 950 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996) (“Public policy continues to disfavor gambling[.]”).  For the text of New
York Penal Law section 225.00(2), see supra note 42 and accompanying text.  For R
further discussion of how DFS works, see supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text. R
44. Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *4–6 (discussing only whether entry fees
were “something of value” under New York Penal Law section 225.00(2)); see also
9
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tice Mendez could not have concluded that DFS amounts to gam-
bling in violation of state law and thereby ordered the
injunctions.45
Justice Mendez also found that the Unlawful Internet Gam-
bling Enforcement Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”)46 offered FanDuel and
DraftKings no protection from scrutiny or regulation under state
law.47  UIGEA is a federal law that prohibits businesses from “know-
ingly accepting payments in connection with . . . a bet or wager that
involves the use of the Internet and that is unlawful under any fed-
eral or state law.”48  FanDuel and DraftKings reasoned that UIGEA
contained a carve-out for fantasy sports because participation in
fantasy contests does not constitute a “bet or wager.”49  Therefore,
as a type of fantasy sports contest, DFS could not be considered
“unlawful Internet gambling.”50  Specifically, the carve-out stipu-
lates that fantasy sports contests will not qualify as “unlawful In-
ternet gambling” if they meet a number of conditions, including
that (1) no fantasy team is made up of members from only a single
“amateur or professional sports” team; (2) all rewards are set before
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 307 (“This ruling seemed to set aside the question of skill R
or chance, as Mandez [sic] pointed out that even if DFS was a game of skill, it
could still meet the requirements for prohibition under NY law.”).
45. See Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *6, *9 (discussing requirements for issu-
ing preliminary injunctions and granting them).
46. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5361–5366 (2006).
47. See Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *7 (reviewing UIGEA and explaining
how it does not apply to companies’ intra-state business).  For further discussion of
UIGEA, see infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. R
48. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 2006 OVERVIEW, Attachment A, at 1, https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/fi
nancial/2010/fil10035a.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN5W-9Y7Y] (last visited Oct. 24,
2016) (summarizing purpose of UIGEA); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (defin-
ing generally “unlawful Internet gambling” under UIGEA); 31 U.S.C. § 5363
(prohibiting persons from accepting any financial instrument for unlawful In-
ternet gambling).  For further discussion of UIGEA and its legislative history, see
infra notes 49–55 and 152–162 and accompanying text. R
49. See Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *7 (reiterating FanDuel and DraftKings’
argument); 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(e)(ix) (explaining that “bet or wager” under
UIGEA does not include “participation in any fantasy . . . game or contest” where
the fantasy sports teams are “based on the current membership of [only one] ac-
tual team”).  DFS participants must have rosters made of players from at least two
teams. See, e.g., Rules and Scoring, supra note 12 (detailing “lineup restrictions”); see R
generally Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: Are Daily Fantasy Sports Legal?, ASIAN
GAMING LAWYER (Sept./Oct. 2015), https://imgl.org/sites/default/files/media/
publications/aredailyfantasysportslegal_nelsonrose_asiangaminglawyer_autumn20
15.pdf [https://perma.cc/F98F-9JAS] (discussing requirements DFS operators
must comply with under section 5362 of UIGEA).  For further discussion of DFS
roster rules, see supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. R
50. See Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *7 (reviewing FanDuel and DraftKings’
reasoning).
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol24/iss2/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\24-2\VLS204.txt unknown Seq: 11  9-MAY-17 12:50
2017] THE LEGALITY OF DAILY FANTASY SPORTS 285
contests begin; and (3) “winning outcomes reflect the relative
knowledge and skill of the participants and are determined
predominantly by . . . the performance[s] of [multiples athletes] in
multiple real-world sporting . . . events.”51  FanDuel and DraftKings
argued that they satisfied these conditions.52  However, Justice Men-
dez explained that the exemption did not displace current state
law.53  He noted that the Internet gambling prohibited by UIGEA
includes those bets or wagers that are unlawful under state law and
that the UIGEA exception did not apply because there was no co-
rollary New York statutory exemption for fantasy sports.54  Moreo-
ver, he indicated that UIGEA was entirely inapplicable and was of
no value to FanDuel and DraftKings because UIGEA does not gov-
ern intrastate Internet gambling, where “bet[s] or wager[s] [are]
initiated and received or otherwise made exclusively within a single
State.”55
Nonetheless, things looked up for the DFS companies because
of the staying of the injunctions, and legislators quickly made
moves to authorize DFS.56  In February 2016, New York State Sena-
tor John J. Bonacic introduced a promising bill to legalize, but thor-
oughly regulate, DFS.57  Then, the following month, FanDuel and
51. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(e)(ix) (detailing conditions).
52. See, e.g., Memorandum of FanDuel, supra note 38, at *25 (examining R
UIGEA).
53. See Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *7 (explaining inapplicability of
UIGEA); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (expressing UIGEA’s “rule of construction” to
not limit states’ gambling laws).  For further discussion of this rule of construction,
see infra notes 154–163 and accompanying text. R
54. See Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *7 (clarifying why UIGEA does not auto-
matically legalize DFS in New York).
55. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(B)) (interpreting UIGEA literally and
narrowly); see also Dustin Gouker, UIGEA Author: “No One Ever Conceived” That Law
Would Allow Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 8, 2015, 8:15 AM), http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/1369/uigea-author-did-not-intend-daily-fantasy-sports-
carveout/ [https://perma.cc/V3YJ-T7MV] (describing how legislators created
UIGEA carve-out for season-long fantasy sports); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 297 R
(pointing out lack of evidence that UIGEA drafters had DFS in mind when creat-
ing exemption for fantasy sports).  For further discussion of DFS’s origin, see supra
note 1 and accompanying text. R
56. People v. Fanduel, Inc., No. 453056/15, 2016 WL 1134804, at *2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 2016) (recounting ordering of stay); Dustin Gouker, Newest Fan-
tasy Sports Bill in New York Is the One to Watch, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 24, 2016,
11:10 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/8509/newest-new-york-dfs-bill/
[https://perma.cc/3TJZ-NH4A] (discussing DFS bills in play).
57. See Gouker, supra note 56 (comparing bill to previous ones that took less R
“rigorous approach[es]”).  Noticeably, Senator Bonacic’s bill focused more on
consumer protections. See id. (providing overview of bill).
11
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DraftKings settled with NYAG.58  However, under the settlement
agreements, FanDuel and DraftKings agreed to halt operations in
New York at least until September 2016, when the appellate hearing
on Justice Mendez’s order was scheduled to take place.59  Impor-
tantly, the parties stipulated that if New York authorized DFS by
June 30, 2016, NYAG would drop lawsuits against the DFS
powerhouses and allow them to quickly restart operations.60
To DraftKings and FanDuel’s luck, the legislature passed a DFS
bill just two weeks shy of the June 30 deadline.61  There was some
delay in getting the bill to New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo,
but on August 3, 2016, Governor Cuomo signed the bill into law,
just one day after requesting that it be sent to his desk.62
58. See Chris Grove, FanDuel, DraftKings Reach Settlement with New York Attorney
General ,  LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Mar. 24, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/9130/fanduel-draftkings-reach-ny-settlement/ [https:/
/perma.cc/F3NF-KTAD] (relaying news of settlements).  For further discussion of
the settlement agreements, see infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. R
59. See Grove, supra note 58 (providing conditions of settlements and links to R
agreements).  For further discussion of Justice Mendez’s order, see supra notes
38–55 and accompanying text. R
60. See Grove, supra note 58 (noting that false advertising claims would still be R
pursued).  NYAG brought false advertisement claims when seeking the injunctions
against the companies in November 2015. See People v. Fanduel, Inc., No.
453056/15, 2015 WL 8490461, at *3, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015) (bringing
charges because NYAG believed DFS operators misled consumers about their legal-
ity and, to a certain extent, guaranteed that participants could win regardless of
skill).  NYAG settled these false advertising claims with DraftKings and FanDuel for
$12 million. See Patrick Hipes, DraftKings & FanDuel Settle NY Lawsuits For $12M,
DEADLINE (Oct. 25, 2016, 1:46 PM), http://deadline.com/2016/10/draftkings-
fanduel-new-york-settlement-lawsuits-1201842592/ (paying $6 million each). But
see In re Daily Fantasy Sports Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 158 F. Supp. 3d 1375,
1379 (J.P.M.L. 2016) (combining various jurisdictions’ private suits against
FanDuel and DraftKings into one multi-jurisdictional litigation, where certain mar-
keting tactics were scrutinized).
61. See Dustin Gouker, DraftKings, FanDuel Beat The Clock in New York: Legisla-
ture Passes Fantasy Sports Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 17, 2016, 11:15 PM), http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/10514/new-york-passes-fantasy-sports-bill/ [https://
perma.cc/KX2X-6D9D] (passing more easily in New York State Assembly than in
Senate); see also Dustin Gouker, New York Casinos Emerge as Possible Stumbling Block
for Daily Fantasy Sports Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 24, 2016, 4:51 PM), http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/10160/ny-casinos-and-fantasy-sports/ [https://
perma.cc/WS45-CEPA] (“New York State Sen. John Bonacic originally offered [an-
other] bill back in February [2016], but that bill had sat idle for months.”).  The
original bill was not passed. See Senate Bill S6793A, N.Y. STATE SENATE, https://
www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/s6793/amendment/a [https://
perma.cc/S6SG-VZAQ] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (tracking bill’s progress).
62. See Evan Grossman, What’s the Holdup with Daily Fantasy Sports in New York?
Ask Gov. Cuomo, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 27, 2016, 1:50 PM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/sports/holdup-daily-fantasy-ny-gov-cuomo-article-1.2689891 (describing
how Governor Cuomo did not call for bill after a week of its passing in legislature);
Dustin Gouker, Still No Daily Fantasy Sports in New York: Wait Continues for Governor to
Act on Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (July 27, 2016, 9:56 AM), http://www.legalsports
12
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Since the end of August 2016, DraftKings and FanDuel, along
with other DFS operators, have returned to New York.63  With only
temporary licenses to operate in hand, they continue the process
for receiving full licenses.64
2. A Glimpse Inside New York’s DFS Law
From the outset, the New York statute addresses Justice Men-
dez’s and critics’ concerns that DFS is gambling under New York
law, legislatively finding that DFS contests constitute neither “games
of chance” nor “wagers on future contingent events not under the
contestants’ control or influence.”65  As such, the statute explicitly
report.com/10807/wait-continues-new-york-fantasy-sports-law/ [https://
perma.cc/JY97-LY35] (noting that by end of July 2016, Governor had still not
called for bill); Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Legalize and Regulate Fantasy Sports
in New York State, N.Y. STATE (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/
governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-legalize-and-regulate-fantasy-sports-new-york-state
[https://perma.cc/8XM2-ULVA] (conveying Governor Cuomo’s concession to
sign bill because it legalizes and regulates popular DFS industry); Dustin Gouker,
Long Wait for New York Daily Fantasy Sports Almost Over, as Bill Heads to Governor,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 2, 2016, 7:46 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/
10865/ny-governor-requests-dfs-bill/ [https://perma.cc/YU4W-42S7] (reflecting
what would happen if he did or did not sign it). See generally Senate Bill S8153, N.Y.
STATE SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/S8153 (last vis-
ited Dec. 27, 2016) (providing legislative history and text of Senate version of bill);
Assembly Bill A10736, N.Y. STATE SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/
bills/2015/a10736/amendment/original [https://perma.cc/7NMS-W4CC] (last
visited Dec. 27, 2016) (providing Assembly version of bill). See also N.Y. RAC. PARI-
MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW §§ 1402–12 (McKinney 2016) (codifying New York’s DFS
bill); see generally How a Bill Becomes a Law, N.Y. STATE SENATE, https://
www.nysenate.gov/how-bill-becomes-law-1 [https://perma.cc/AWL5-KW3T] (ex-
plaining how governor has ten days to either sign or veto bill when legislature is in
session).
63. Dustin Gouker, DraftKings, FanDuel Among Daily Fantasy Sports Sites Now
Live in New York, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 22, 2016, 12:42 PM), http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/11160/draftkings-fanduel-new-york-return/ [https://
perma.cc/8RBH-BSDG] (noting how certain DFS operators are allowed to operate
in New York now with temporary permits); Nick Niedzwiadek, Cuomo Signs Daily
Fantasy Sports Bill, POLITICO (last updated Aug. 3, 2016, 5:27 PM), http://
www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/08/cuomo-signs-daily-fan-
tasy-sports-bill-104490 [https://perma.cc/FN53-9KAX] (“The bill allows for daily
fantasy sports companies operating before November 10[,] 2015, the date when
Schneiderman filed his suits, to receive temporary permits to resume operating in
New York immediately.”).  For further discussion of the details of the DFS legisla-
tion, see infra notes 65–79 and accompanying text. R
64. See Gouker, supra note 63 (linking to permits of five DFS operators). R
65. Compare N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1400(1) (McKinney
2016) (explaining that DFS contests are not “games of chance” because partici-
pants use “skill and knowledge” to create teams and winners are result of partici-
pant’s purposeful selections across multiple, independent sporting events), with
People v. Fanduel, Inc., No. 453056/15, 2015 WL 8490461, at *6, *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 11, 2015) (ordering injunctions against FanDuel and DraftKings based on
finding that NYAG established that DFS likely constituted illegal gambling).
13
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states that “the legislature declares that interactive fantasy sports do
not constitute gambling in New York State as defined in article
[225] of the penal law.”66  The statute subsequently provides re-
quirements for DFS operators.67  For one thing, DFS operators
must register and be approved by the New York Gaming Commis-
sion (“Commission”) as well as abide by the rules and regulations it
promulgates.68  The Commission must also approve the types and
quantity of contests that a DFS operator offers.69  In addition, DFS
operators must provide a statement of their assets and liabilities for
review.70
Because the registration and approval process will take some
time, the legislation does permit DFS operators that were active in
New York prior to November 10, 2015, to receive temporary per-
mits, which will be valid until their registrations are approved or
denied.71  If approved, registrations will remain effective for three
years, after which they must be renewed.72  If denied, the DFS oper-
ator must cease to offer contests “for which a[ ] . . . player pays an
66. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. § 1400(2). But see Fanduel, 2015 WL
8490461, at *6 (“Penal Law § 225.00 is broadly worded and as currently written
sufficient for finding that DFS involves illegal gambling.”).
67. See generally RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. §§ 1402–12 (providing rules
and regulatory framework).  For the New York Senate and Assembly versions of
this bill, see supra note 62. R
68. See RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. § 1401(3) (defining “commission”); id.
§ 1402(1)(a) (granting this power to Commission); see also id. § 1402(6) (explain-
ing how regulations will relate to “the registration and operation of contests in
New York” and also offer “protections [from] compulsive play and safeguards for
fair play”); id. § 1405 (laying out authority of Commission).
69. See id. § 1401(12) (“A registrant may utilize multiple interactive fantasy
sports platforms and offer multiple contests, provided that each platform and each
contest has been reviewed and approved by the commission.”); id. § 1403(1)(e)
(incorporating this inquiry into registration process).
70. See id. § 1403(1)(f) (noting that disclosure is mandatory).
71. See id. § 1402(1)(b) (clarifying that qualifying DFS operators that receive
temporary permits must apply for registration with Commission); § 1402(2) (indi-
cating that issuance of temporary permit does not mandate the issuance of full
license); see also Interactive Fantasy Sports, N.Y. STATE GAMING COMMISSION, https://
www.gaming.ny.gov/ifs/ [https://perma.cc/XL8T-C435] (offering applications
for temporary permits).
72. See RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. § 1402(3) (stating that Commission will
develop renewal process).  It seems that the Commission has yet to create such
process. See Interactive Fantasy Sports, supra note 71 (stating that registration forms R
for full licenses are not available).
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entry fee.”73  At this time, there does not seem to be an appeals
process in place.74
For each year that a DFS operator is registered, it must submit
an annual report to the Commission.75  The Commission may then
perform a financial audit as part of its review.76  Moreover, a regis-
tered DFS operator must maintain certain safeguards and stan-
dards.77  These include limiting players from having multiple active
accounts, prohibiting individuals under the age of eighteen from
participating in DFS contests, and having preventative and correc-
tive measures in place to combat or respond to violations.78
Finally, but importantly, the bill also requires DFS operators
that are approved to pay “a tax equivalent to fifteen percent of their
interactive fantasy sports gross revenue generated within [New
York]” in addition to other tax and regulatory costs.79
73. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED.  § 1402(1)(a) (limiting reach of regula-
tion).  This is because New York Penal Law section 225.00 requires “something of
value” for a transaction to constitute gambling. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(2)
(McKinney 2015) (defining “gambling”).  An “entry fee” under the DFS legislation
is not limited to money. See RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. § 1401(4) (including
“cash equivalents” as well).
74. See RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. §§ 1400–12 (mentioning no appellate
review).
75. See id. § 1406(1) (providing yearly submission date as well).
76. See id. § 1406(2) (declaring that audit can be done at whatever time Com-
mission deems necessary).
77. See id. § 1404 (maintaining that these standards are what is required at a
minimum).  For further discussion of these standards, see infra note 78 and accom- R
panying text.
78. See RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. § 1404(1) (listing measures to which
DFS operators must adhere); see also id. § 1402(6) (implying that fear of players
engaging in “compulsive play” is informing safeguards, especially in regards to
minors).
79. Id. § 1407; see also id. § 1408 (noting that further costs will be related to
total amount expended on regulating DFS industry); id. § 1409 (expressing that
Commission will pay received taxes into New York’s state lottery fund).  “The New
York Lottery’s sole mission is to earn revenue for education.”  Introduction, N.Y.
LOTTERY, http://nylottery.ny.gov/wps/wcm/connect/NYSL+Content+Library/
NYSL+Internet+Site/About+Us/Mission+or+Education/ [https://perma.cc/
XDU3-4UX3] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).  Between 2015 and 2016, $3.3 billion
came from the New York Lottery. See New York Lottery’s Mission, N.Y. LOTTERY,
http://nylottery.ny.gov/wps/wcm/connect/NYSL+Content+Library/NYSL+In
ternet+Site/About+Us/Mission+or+Education/Where™he+Money+Goes [https://
perma.cc/BAX4-6FLJ] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (contributing at least $58 billion
over past forty-eight years); Gov. Cuomo Signs Daily Fantasy Sports Bill, CBS6NEWS
ALBANY (Aug. 3, 2016), http://cbs6albany.com/news/local/gov-cuomo-signs-daily-
fantasy-sports-bill [https://perma.cc/ZN7H-VDYY] (highlighting that New York’s
DFS legislation is expected to generate $4 million in revenue for education
purposes).
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B. Delaware—A Similar Story, but Contrasting Outcome
Delaware currently does not permit DFS.80  The Delaware De-
partment of Justice (“DDOJ”) began investigating the legality of
DFS in the fall of 2015 when controversy erupted in other states.81
The following March, the DDOJ informed state regulators that DFS
contests were not authorized by Delaware law, but opted not to take
action against FanDuel, DraftKings, or other DFS operators in-
state.82  This was because the industry signaled that legislative
changes would be introduced in Delaware’s General Assembly.83
While a bill legalizing DFS was introduced, it was not adopted by
the legislature’s June 30, 2016 deadline.84  Thus, with Delaware law
remaining unchanged, the DDOJ formally sent cease-and-desist let-
ters to DraftKings, FanDuel, and Yahoo!.85
The DDOJ explained its reasoning in a press release.86  It first
pointed out that the Delaware Constitution prohibits “ ‘[a]ll forms
of gambling’ except ‘(a) Lotteries under State control for the pur-
pose of raising funds.’”87  Then it stated how DDOJ attorneys con-
cluded that DFS contests involving money “constitute gambling
because chance, as opposed to skill, is the dominant factor in the
80. See Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra
note 31 (clarifying prohibition is only for DFS contests “that require payment for R
participation and offer cash awards”).  For further discussion of why Delaware out-
lawed DFS, see infra notes 86–91 and accompanying text. R
81. See John Offredo, Delaware Investigating Fantasy Sports Betting, DEL. ONLINE
(last updated Oct. 17, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/
news/2015/10/16/delaware-investigating-fantasy-sports-betting/74079002/
[https://perma.cc/JFY7-NTVD] (mentioning Nevada’s banning of DFS and New
York’s DFS-related insider trading scandal).  For further discussion of New York’s
scandal, see supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. R
82. See Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra
note 31 (providing chronology) R
83. See id. (stating that fantasy sports companies made these indications).
84. See id. (alluding to proposed legislation–House Bill 444); Gouker, supra
note 31 (pointing out that House Bill 444 was introduced quite late); House Bill R
444, DEL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?Legislation
Id=24237 [https://perma.cc/B354-JCGW] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (showing
that bill was introduced just two days before session expired and containing link to
House Bill 444).  As such, the legislature did not vote on the bill. See Wes, Delaware
DOJ Orders Fantasy Sites to Get Out, WORLD FANTASYSITES.COM (July 9, 2016), http://
www.fantasysites.com/delaware-doj-orders-fantasy-sites-get-out/ [https://perma.cc
/NSU8-APYA] (noting how “legislature adjourned before the bill could be
considered”).
85. See Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra
note 31 (hinting disappointment in doing so, but need to follow current law). R
86. See id. (examining prohibitory language of Delaware Constitution).  For
further discussion of Delaware’s constitution, see infra notes 87–89 and accompa- R
nying text.
87. Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra note
31 (alteration in original) (quoting DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 17). R
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outcome of these contests.”88  Therefore, as “games of chance,”
DFS contests were lotteries under the Delaware Constitution, but
not under the state’s control to be legal.89  As such, the DDOJ con-
cluded that DFS contests must cease until Delaware law evolves.90
The department would have to “enforce [existing] law.”91  Thus, all
DFS operators have been inactive in the Delaware since July 2016.92
III. MISPLACED BETS—THE RIGHT RESPONSE FOR
THE OTHER STATE
A. New York’s DFS Statute May Not Be the Winning Draw—
Constitution Still at Play
Governor Cuomo signing New York’s DFS legislation into law
may have decriminalized the industry, but it did not necessarily seal
the deal regarding DFS’s legality in the Empire State.93  Questions
88. Id. The DDOJ conceded that while skill is involved when participants use
their sports knowledge during drafts, because athletes are “human and human
behavior is unpredictable,” chance is the more dominant factor, making DFS con-
tests illegal gambling in Delaware. Id. (reaching its conclusion in skill versus
chance debate); see also Nicole Davidson, Comment, Internet Gambling: Should Fan-
tasy Sports Leagues Be Prohibited?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 243–44 (2002) (explain-
ing how Delaware employs dominant factor test to determine whether skill or
chance is dominant factor in activity).  For further discussion of the dominant fac-
tor test, see infra note 89 and accompanying text. R
89. See Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra
note 31 (reiterating implicitly constitutional requirement that all Delaware lotter- R
ies be under state control); see also Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435
F. Supp. 1372, 1385 (D. Del. 1977) (reviewing Delaware state law and concluding
that “‘lottery’” under Delaware Constitution “should be interpreted to encompass
not only games of pure chance but also games in which chance is the dominant
determining factor”); In re Request of Governor for Advisory Opinion, 12 A.3d
1104, 1113 (Del. 2009), as corrected (May 29, 2009) (adopting Judge Walter K. Sta-
pleton’s conclusion in National Football League).
90. See Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra
note 31 (underscoring that prohibition is limited to only those contests where play- R
ers must pay to play for monetary prizes); see also Jessica Masulli Reyes, Delaware
Puts an End to Fantasy Sports Betting, DEL. ONLINE (last updated July 8, 2016, 10:01
PM),  http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/07/08/delaware-
puts-end-fantasy-sports-betting/86870566/ [https://perma.cc/VKJ7-NR86] (reiter-
ating how DDOJ remarked that DraftKings, FanDuel, and Yahoo! can continue to
operate if Delaware law changes).
91. Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra note
31. R
92. See id. (accounting only for activity that involves real money).
93. See Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Legalize and Regulate Fantasy Sports in
New York State, supra note 62 (sharing news of Governor Cuomo’s signing of DFS R
bill). But see Daniel Wallach, NY Fantasy Sports Law May Face Constitutional Road-
block, LAW360 (June 21, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
809124/nyfantasysportslawmayfaceconstitutionalroadblock [https://perma.cc/
4CUV-ARA3] (detailing how DFS bill may violate New York’s constitution);
Michael McCann, Legal Battle Over DFS in New York Not Necessarily Over, SPORTS IL-
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regarding DFS’s constitutionality still remain.94  Specifically, as one
commentator has pointed out, just because the legislation states
that DFS is not gambling does not mean that it is actually not gam-
bling.95  Such a determination must be made by a court, which will
not be “straightjacketed by the particular labels selected by the leg-
islative body.”96
The New York Constitution is rather restrictive when it comes
to gambling; in fact, it embodies a general policy against it.97  The
constitution specifically authorizes only three forms of gambling—
”state lotteries,” “pari-mutuel betting on horse races,” and “casino
gambling at no more than seven facilities.”98  Furthermore, it en-
trusts the legislature to hinder efforts that violate or attempt to ex-
pand these constitutional exceptions.99
LUSTRATED (June 18, 2016), http://www.si.com/fantasy/2016/06/18/draft-kings-
fan-duel-daily-fantasy-new-york-legalize [https://perma.cc/MD37-QKBV] (convey-
ing same constitutional issues); see also Andy Moore, Does State Regulation of Fantasy
Sports Violate PASPA?, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/734823/does-state-regulation-of-fantasy-sports-violate-paspa [https://
perma.cc/TBN6-TCFF] (providing federal complications with proposed DFS
bills).  For further discussion of the constitutionality issues of New York’s DFS legis-
lation, see infra notes 94–130 and accompanying text. R
94. See Wallach, supra note 93 (explaining that although the language of New R
York’s DFS bill declares that DFS is not gambling, judiciary will have final say on
matter if constitutionality of bill is challenged).  For the text of New York’s DFS
bill, see supra notes 62 and 67 and accompanying text.  The Stop Predatory Gam- R
bling group is already spearheading citizens’ private suit challenging the legiti-
macy and constitutionality of New York’s new DFS law. See Dustin Gouker, Anti-
Gambling Group Leads Lawsuit Against New York Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS
REP. (Oct. 5, 2016, 7:46 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11750/new-york-
dfs-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/4D88-X6UF] (describing lawsuit).  For further dis-
cussion of this litigation, see infra note 127 and accompanying text. R
95. See Wallach, supra note 93 (critiquing New York’s legislature’s attempt to R
curtail judicial review).
96. Id. (describing how New York court may disregard conclusion of legisla-
tors and instead inquire into law’s purpose when interpreting statute) (citing Mee-
gan v. Brown, 16 N.Y.3d 395, 403 (2011); People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 152
(1937)); see also N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1400(1)–(2) (McKinney
2016) (declaring that DFS is not gambling under New York Penal Law section
225.00).  For further discussion of New York Penal Law section 225.00), see supra
notes 28, 42–45 and accompanying text. R
97. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting gambling generally); Wallach, supra
note 91 (citation omitted) (discussing how this prohibitory language signifies
“public policy . . . against commercialized gambling”); see also N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 5-401 (McKinney 1965) (making unlawful “[a]ll wagers, bets or stakes, made
to depend upon any . . . lot, chance, casualty, or unknown or contingent event”).
For further discussion of New York’s constitution and its policy against gambling,
see supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
98. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.  For further discussion of this constitutional
section, see supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. R
99. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“[T]he legislature shall pass appropriate laws to
prevent offenses against any of the provisions of this section.”).
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Accordingly, policymakers must have been aware of the per-
ception that DFS could be considered gambling under New York
law, especially in light of the NYAG’s actions against DraftKings and
FanDuel.100  This accounts for the state legislature’s tactical deci-
sion to include language declaring it otherwise in the DFS stat-
ute.101  The constitutional issue was on legislators’ radar as well, but
was likely brushed aside to get the DFS bill passed quickly so that
the state could begin to earn revenue through regulations aimed at
financing educational aid.102
There were three options for legalizing DFS: (1) passing a bill
declaring that DFS was not gambling and therefore legal; (2)
changing the statutory definitions of “gambling” and “contest of
chance” in tandem with passing a DFS bill; or (3) amending the
constitution to permit DFS as the fourth exception to the state’s
general gambling ban.103  New York went with the first option,
seemingly the easiest of the three because it involved the least mov-
ing parts.104
Had the legislators changed the definitions of “contest of
chance” and “gambling” under New York Penal Law section 225.00
to (1) heighten the requisite degree of chance to qualify for the
former and (2) add that a person must lack all control or influence
over a “future contingent event” in the latter, the less likely it would
100. Compare DraftKings Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 26, and FanDuel R
Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 26 (denouncing DFS as “illegal gambling”), with R
N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1400(1)-(2) (proclaiming that DFS does
not constitute gambling).
101. See N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1400(1)–(2) (addressing
gambling concern by excluding DFS from New York Penal Law section 225.00’s
definitional purview); Wallach, supra note 91 (deducing that legislators are strate-
gically trying to “skirt” New York Constitution by defining DFS outside the bounds
of Penal Law section 225.00, but questioning effectiveness of move).
102. See Dustin Gouker, New York Assembly Passes Fantasy Sports Bill, Which is Still
Stalled in Senate, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 17, 2016, 12:02 PM), http://www.legal
sportsreport.com/10501/new-york-dfs-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/RRF3-
DYMB] (noting how New York Assembly members opposing DFS bill openly ques-
tioned its constitutionality, but were dismissed by bill’s sponsor, who reasoned that
legislature could sidestep issue by defining DFS “as not gambling”); Governor Cuomo
Signs Legislation to Legalize and Regulate Fantasy Sports in New York State, supra note 62 R
(publicizing how bill is expected to generate about “$4 million in revenue to fund
state education aid”).  For a discussion of how New York’s DFS industry will help
fund education, see supra note 79 and accompanying text.  The consumer protec- R
tion benefits of the bill were also a motivating factor for getting the bill passed. See
Gouker, supra (mentioning consumer protection benefit of approving DFS bill
sooner rather than later).
103. See Wallach, supra note 93 (suggesting options).  For further discussion R
of these options, see infra notes 105–130 and accompanying text. R
104. See Wallach, supra note 93 (labeling legislature’s action as “riskiest of R
three options”).
19
Mathew: The Legality of Daily Fantasy Sports is in Gamble in Some States:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\24-2\VLS204.txt unknown Seq: 20  9-MAY-17 12:50
294 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24: p. 275
be to find a constitutional issue because the New York Constitution
does not define “gambling.”105  In fact, courts have looked to the
statutory definitions as determinative.106  By changing the defini-
tions, if a New York court was to consider the constitutionality of
the current DFS legislation, then the exclusion of DFS as gambling
under Penal Law section 225.00 would persuade a court to find that
it is not gambling.107  While such an exclusion still goes against the
spirit of constitutional prohibition, DFS would have protection not
based only on a siloed legislative finding, as it currently has, but by
definitional exclusions that will likely restrain a contrary judicial in-
terpretation.108  However, as the DFS statute presently stands, it can
be constitutionally attacked through Penal Law section 225.00.109
Had the DFS bill been introduced with or only after the suggested
changes to Penal Law section 225.00, such an attack would at least
have been hindered from its starting point.110
The other option would have been to amend the New York
State Constitution to include an exception for DFS, thereby quiet-
ing any fear of a constitutional violation.111  Authorizing DFS
105. Cf. id. (“[T]he Legislature could have changed the statutory definition of
“gambling” under Section 225.00 to require a ‘predominance’ of luck or chance,
which is the . . . threshold used in many other states.”); Wallach, supra note 38 R
(describing how under “‘predominant factor’ test[,] ‘chance’ must predominate
over ‘skill’ before gambling will be said to exist”, but New York “sets a much lower
bar”).  Because New York decided to “simply remove[ ]” DFS contests from the
Penal Law’s “reach,”  Wallach foresaw the constitutional challenge to the DFS bill.
See Wallach, supra note 93 (exploring constitutional issues).  Compare N.Y. CONST. R
art. I, § 9 (supplying no definition for gambling), and supra note 41 and accompa- R
nying text, with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (McKinney 2015), and supra note 42 R
and accompanying text (supplying definition for gambling).
106. See, e.g., People v. Fanduel, Inc., No. 453056/15, 2015 WL 8490461, at *6
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015) (reviewing language of New York Penal Law sections
225.00(1)–(2) and concluding that DFS contests can fall within them).  For further
discussion of this opinion, see supra notes 37–55 and accompanying text. R
107. See Wallach, supra note 93 (discussing how “critical” New York Penal Law R
section 225.00 will be in lawsuits, but reminding that statutory law cannot exceed
constitutional limits, authorizing what the latter prohibits).  For further discussion
of how New York courts determine what constitutes gambling, see supra note 28 R
and accompanying text.
108. Cf. Wallach, supra note 93 (noting that constitution embodies general R
policy against gambling, but also implying how New York legislators strategically
should have amended New York Penal Law section 225.00).
109. Compare N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1400 (McKinney
2016) (presenting legislative findings), with N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9, and N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 225.00(1)–(2) (permitting plausible conclusion that DFS is gambling).
110. See generally, e.g., Fanduel, 2015 WL 8490461, at *4, *6 (looking to statu-
tory definition of gambling when deciding whether to grant injunctions against
DraftKings and FanDuel as unlawful gambling operators).
111. See Wallach, supra note 93 (remarking that this option was New York’s R
“safest play”); Bennett Liebman, Fantasy Sports Legislation in New York State: Can it Be
Effective?, SARATOGA INST. ON EQUINE RACING, AND GAMING LAW (Mar. 9, 2016),
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through constitutional amendment would have taken much more
time, however, and time constraints were likely the underlying rea-
son legislators minimized constitutional issues during floor
discussions.112
There are a number of requirements that must be satisfied to
amend New York’s constitution.113  First, the amendment must be
proposed in both houses of New York’s bicameral legislature—what
it calls its Senate and Assembly.114  Once proposed, it must also be
sent to the NYAG, who, within twenty days, should provide a written
opinion describing how the constitution will be affected by the
amendment.115  Thereafter, each house must vote to adopt the
amendment.116  A majority vote is required in both houses for the
amendment to move forward.117  If the majority vote is achieved,
then the amendment is “referred to the next regular legislative ses-
sion convening after the succeeding general election of members,” where
both the Senate and Assembly must again vote in favor of the
amendment by a majority vote.118  In other words, two “‘separately-
elected’” legislative sessions are required to approve an amend-
ment.119  With such approval, the amendment must next be submit-
https://saratogainstitute.wordpress.com/2016/03/09/fantasy-sports-legislation-in-
new-york-state-can-it-be-effective/#_ftnref5 [https://perma.cc/GQ8K-DY57] (illu-
minating constitutional issues with DFS as well, particularly how legislature cannot
impose “post-enactment legislative history” on New York Constitution).
112. See Gouker, supra note 102 (playing down constitutional concerns be- R
cause bill’s sponsor had “set[ ] up the rush to legalize DFS”); Wallach, supra note
93 (explaining New York’s amendment process and how long it would have taken R
to legalize DFS this way).  For further discussion of this amendment process and
timeframe, see infra notes 113–124 and accompanying text. See also Dustin R
Gouker, The New Daily Fantasy Sports Bill in New York Brings Up PASPA Concerns,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 4, 2015, 9:35 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/66
50/ny-dfs-bill-and-paspa/ [https://perma.cc/5CGQ-8HQG] (discussing proposed
amendment to New York Constitution excepting fantasy sports, but noting that it
raised federal preemption issue as amendment would possibly conflict with Profes-
sional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 [“PASPA”]).  For further discus-
sion of this PASPA, see infra notes 143–164 and accompanying text. R
113. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (providing amendment process).
114. See id. (including both houses); see also Branches of Government in New York
State, N.Y. STATE SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/branches-government-new-
york-state [https://perma.cc/97G6-79B9] (last visited Jan. 16, 2017) (explaining
New York’s legislative branch structure).
115. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (noting that failure of NYAG to provide opin-
ion within twenty day-period or at all will not “affect the validity of . . . proposed
amendment”).
116. See id. (requiring vote from both legislative houses).
117. See id. (supplying requisite approval standard).
118. Id. (emphasis added) (noting that the first legislative session must pub-
lish the adopted proposed amendment for three months).
119. Wallach, supra note 93 (explaining the two rounds of legislature voting); R
Yolanne Almanzar, How Does New York State Change Its Constitution?, N.Y. WORLD
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ted to the public at a referendum and must receive a majority
vote.120  Only then will the amendment become part of the New
York State Constitution.121  Moreover, even with the electorate’s
requisite vote, the amendment will not take effect until the follow-
ing January 1.122
This means that if legislators wanted to legalize DFS through a
constitutional amendment, the DFS amendment would have
needed approval during the 2016 legislative session, which typically
lasts between January and June of each year.123  The Assembly and
Senate would both need to approve it again in 2017 to then submit
it to the general public for approval to finally become effective on
January 1 of 2018—a two-year process.124  Such an elongated time-
line likely dissuaded legislators from going this route, especially
when New York’s DFS regulation is expected to bring in millions in
state revenue each year.125
Nonetheless, legalizing and defining DFS through its own sepa-
rate statute exposes the legislation to a much stronger constitu-
tional attack.126  A lawsuit already initiated against Governor
Cuomo and the Commission asserting that the DFS legislation vio-
lates the state constitution illustrates this.127  Specifically, the com-
(Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/03/26/the-daily-q-how-
does-new-york-state-change-its-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/EZB3-YG6A] (re-
viewing amendment process in context of 2012 constitutional proposal).
120. See N.Y. CONST., art. XIX, § 1 (stating that legislature has some discretion
on when to submit proposed amendment to voters); Wallach, supra note 93 (clari- R
fying that amendment will be placed on ballots).
121. See N.Y. CONST., art. XIX, § 1 (reaching this conclusion).
122. See id.  (“[S]uch amendment . . . shall become a part of the constitution
on the first day of January next after such approval.”).
123. See Wallach, supra note 93 (outlining timeframe); New York State - R
Legislative Session Calendar, N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/
calendar/ [https://perma.cc/MC6R-R39B] (providing schedule of New York
legislature).
124. See Wallach, supra note 93 (delving into amendment process). R
125. See Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Legalize and Regulate Fantasy Sports in
New York State, supra note 62 (discussing economic benefits of bill).  For further R
discussion of these economic benefits, see supra notes 79 and 102 and accompany- R
ing text.
126. See Wallach, supra note 93 (noting how exceptions in New York Constitu- R
tion were created through amendment and not by statute alone).  For a survey of
the current exceptions, see supra note 98 and accompanying text. R
127. See Gouker, supra note 94 (linking to verified complaint); Rick Karlin, R
Anti-Gambling Group Sues New York Over Daily Fantasy Sports Legalization, TIMES
UNION (last updated Oct. 6, 2016, 7:12 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/
article/Anti-gambling-group-sues-New-York-over-daily-9864264.php [https://
perma.cc/R6DN-SN39]  (describing how four New York women, “whose lives have
[somehow] been [personally] disrupted by [gambling disorders],” claim that state
constitution protects them from gambling).  The Commission oversees the regula-
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plaint states that DFS is gambling and the legislature cannot
unilaterally “legalize what the Constitution prohibits.”128
The New York legislature should have taken the constitutional
prohibition seriously as legislatures did in Delaware, and worked
towards legalizing DFS through legitimate means.129  Now, the en-
acted regulatory system lies in the balance.130
B. Delaware Should Have Taken a Bite out of the Apple
On the other hand, Delaware should have passed its DFS bill,
House Bill 444, as the New York legislature did because it would not
have been as vulnerable to a constitutional attack.131  While the Del-
aware Constitution generally prohibits gambling, it is far more per-
missive than New York’s constitution.132  That is, DFS could have
tion of the DFS industry. See N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1405 (Mc-
Kinney 2016) (conferring Commission with this responsibility).
128. Verified Complaint, at 2, ¶ 4, White v. Cuomo, No. 5861/2016 (N.Y.
Gen. Term Oct. 5, 2016), available at http://stoppredatorygambling.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/10/2016-NY-DFS-lawsuit.pdf [https://perma.cc/SUU9-JT37].
129. Compare Gouker, supra note 102 (conveying certain legislator’s dismissive R
attitude towards constitutional questions raised during debates on New York’s DFS
bill), and Wallach, supra note 93 (foreseeing that New York legislators would come R
to bemoan their chosen path for legalizing DFS through standalone statute), with
Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra note 31 (out- R
lawing DFS because of constitutional prohibition despite acknowledging how
much “Delaware residents and visitors . . . enjoy participating in the full array of
fantasy sports contests”).
130. See Verified Complaint, supra note 128, at 1, ¶ 1 (suing to declare DFS R
legislation unconstitutional). But see Justin Fielkow, New York’s Interactive Fantasy
Sports Law Faces Constitutional Challenge, SPORTS ESQUIRES (Oct. 10, 2016), http://
thesportsesquires.com/new-yorks-interactive-fantasy-sports-law-faces-constitutional-
challenge/#_ednref6 [https://perma.cc/MY9Y-SRWS] (underscoring that New
York statutes are “presumed” constitutional and plaintiffs must show “‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ that fantasy sports contests constitute unlawful gambling”—a
high burden) (citing Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n., 71
N.Y.2d 313, 319–320 (1988); Samuels v. New York State Dep’t of Health, 29 A.D.3d
9, 12 (2006)); see also Dustin Gouker, Once a Daily Fantasy Sports Opponent, New York
AG Schneiderman Defends Law in New Filing, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 13, 2017, 11:46
AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/12650/schneiderman-and-fantasy-sports/
[https://perma.cc/W2NL-VJCW] (reasoning that New York Constitution endows
legislature with “broad latitude” in establishing state’s gambling laws) (quoting
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, White v. Cuomo, No.
5861/2016 (N.Y. Gen. Term Jan. 11, 2017) available at http://www.legalsportsre
port.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/MOL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD7F-
6NTD]).
131. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. II, § 17 (permitting lotteries, which arguably
would include DFS contests, under “[s]tate control”).  For further discussion of
Delaware’s constitution and its failure to pass House Bill 444, see supra notes 84–91 R
and accompanying text.
132. Compare DEL. CONST., art. II, § 17 (providing broad exceptions to general
prohibition against gambling), with N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 9 (providing narrow
exceptions).
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been legalized through House Bill 444 itself, without having to
amend Delaware Constitution.133  This is because Delaware consti-
tutionally permits lotteries if they are under the state’s control.134
Lottery, as used in the constitution, is construed rather broadly and
is “judicially defined as ‘a scheme for the distribution of money or
prizes by chance.’”135  Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court
has opined that a lottery involves three elements: “ ‘prize, considera-
tion and chance.’”136  Satisfying these two requirements, DFS would
constitute a “lottery” in Delaware.137  As such, as long as Delaware
regulates the industry “for the purpose of raising funds,” DFS could
fit into this established constitutional exception.138
Even if a court ruled that DFS was not a “lottery” and that a
constitutional amendment were required to legalize DFS, this
would still be easier to accomplish in Delaware than in New York.139
133. See Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra
note 31 (suggesting that DFS contests could constitute “lotteries” under Delaware R
Constitution); see also DEL. CONST., art. II, § 17 (including no constitutional defini-
tion of “lottery”).  For further discussion of how DFS contests could be “lotteries”
under Delaware’s constitution, see supra notes 87–89 and infra notes 134–138 and R
accompanying text.
134. See DEL. CONST., art. II, § 17 (stating exceptions to gambling prohibition,
which include state controlled lotteries).
135. Affiliated Enters. v. Waller, 5 A.2d 257, 259 (Del. 1939) (quoting State v.
Sedgwick, 81 A. 472, 473 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1911); State v. Gilbert, 374, 100 A. 410
(Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917)).  The Waller court further adopted that “[a]n accept-
able definition is one offered by the Missouri Courts where a lottery is defined as
any scheme or device whereby anything of value is, for a consideration, allotted by
chance.” Id. (citing State v. Emerson, 1 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. 1927), rev’d on other
grounds by State v. Hardy, 276 S.W.2d 90 (1955)).
136. In re Request of Governor for Advisory Opinion, 12 A.3d 1104, 1111
(Del. 2009), as corrected (May 29, 2009) (quoting Nat’l Football League v. Governor
of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1383 (D. Del. 1977) (determining constitutionality of
Delaware sports betting bill).  For further discussion of this opinion, see supra note
89 and accompanying text. R
137. See id. at 1114 (concluding that “the Delaware Constitution allows lotter-
ies to involve an element of skill, but only where chance predominates”); see also
supra notes 135–136 and accompanying text (describing what constitutes “lottery” R
under Delaware Constitution).
138. See DEL. CONST. art. II, § 17 (presenting this stipulation); see also Online
Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra note 31 (alluding to R
possibility that DFS could be legalized through statue alone).  House Bill 444, in
fact, proposed that DFS would be under Delaware’s control and would raise funds
for the state. See H.B. 444, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2016), available at
http://legis.delaware.gov/json/BillDetail/GetHtmlDocument?fileAttachmentId
=49672 [https://perma.cc/JC9G-EXQU] (requiring any DFS operator to be regis-
tered with director of Delaware Lottery Commission in sections 4863 and 4866).
Section 4868 stated that fifteen percent of DFS operators’ gross revenue must be
paid to Delaware as a tax. See id.
139. Compare DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (explaining how to amend Delaware
Constitution), with N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (stating how to amend New York
Constitution).
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Delaware does not require a popular vote like New York does.140
Instead, it only requires that two-thirds of two successive legislatures
vote in favor of the amendment.141  Had the 2016 session voted in
favor of a constitutional amendment to legalize DFS, the industry
could have been up and running as early as 2017.142
C. A Federal Contender—The Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act of 1992
Even if New York or Delaware were to legalize DFS statutorily
or by constitutional amendment, a federal preemption issue re-
mains.143  The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of
1992 (“PASPA”)144 is a federal law that makes it “unlawful for a gov-
ernment entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or
authorize . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly . . . on one or more
140. See DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (mentioning no requirement for popular
approval). But see N.Y. CONST., Art. XIX, § 1 (“[T]he people shall approve and
ratify such amendment . . . by a majority of the electors voting.”).
141. See DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (noting that both houses must vote in
favor).  Further, a general election must separate the two legislative votes. See id.
(“[I]f in the General Assembly next after the said [general] election such pro-
posed amendment . . . be agreed to by two thirds of all the members elected to
each House, the same shall thereupon become part of the Constitution.”).
142. See id. (indicating immediate effectiveness of constitutional amend-
ments); see also Tom Grazing, DoJ Issues Letters to Stop Real Money Daily Fantasy Con-
tests in Delaware, PLAYING LEGAL (July 15, 2016), https://playinglegal.com/news/
doj-issues-letters-stop-real-money-daily-fantasy-contests-delaware-3416 [https://
perma.cc/DEE5-Q65B] (noting how Delaware’s legislative session expired on June
30 with no DFS bill passed). See generally Schedule for the Second Legislative Session of
the 148th General Assembly, DELAWARE STATE SENATE, http://www.desenatedems.com
/legislative-schedule.html [https://perma.cc/2DN9-9BDX] (suggesting that legis-
lative sessions last between January and June of each year).
143. See Garrett Greene, When Fantasy Becomes Reality: Attempts to Regulate the
Highly Unregulated Daily Fantasy Sports Industry, 47 ST. MARY’S L. J. 821, 832–40
(2016) (overviewing PASPA and exploring whether legalizing DFS violates it in
certain states); Gouker, supra note 112 (raising PASPA concern for legalizing DFS R
through statute or constitutional amendment in New York); Moore, supra note 93 R
(analyzing how PASPA implicates DFS regulations); Daniel Wallach, No Question,
PASPA Applies to Daily Fantasy Sports, SPORTS LAW BLOG (Jan. 11, 2016, 1:18 PM),
http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2016/01/no-question-paspa-applies-to-daily.html
[https://perma.cc/EE99-987Q] (explaining PASPA violation if states pass DFS leg-
islation); Richik Sarkar, Daily Fantasy Sports: A Regulatory Dilemma Worth Resolving,
ABA CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. COMMITTEE NEWSL. at 1–3 (2016), http://
apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL230000pub/newsletter/201603/
feature_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS59-88Y4] (explaining that states may only be
able to ban DFS or do nothing because of PASPA).  For further discussion of how
PASPA implicates states’ abilities to regulate DFS, see infra notes 144–167 and ac- R
companying text.
144. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 3701–3704 (1992).
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competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes par-
ticipate.”145  DFS would most likely be considered a “wagering
scheme,” even if not a form of betting or gambling, because win-
ning in DFS contests is based upon the real-life performances of
professional athletes.146  Conceding this, PASPA seemingly prohib-
its federal and state governments from authorizing or regulating
DFS.147  This means that New York’s DFS legislation violates this
federal law.148  Moreover, PASPA also makes it unlawful for “per-
145. Id. § 3702(1).
146. See Wallach, supra note 143 (exploring how state DFS regulations interact R
with section 3702 of PASPA).  For further discussion of how DFS contests work, see
supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text. R
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (stating in plain language that government can-
not “directly or indirectly” sanction sports “betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme[s]”).
148. See id.; Moore, supra note 93 (applying § 3702(1) to New York’s legisla- R
tive efforts). Delaware has a partial exemption from PASPA. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 3704(a) (creating exceptions to PASPA’s ban on sports betting for “wagering
schemes . . . conducted by [a] State . . . [between] January 1, 1976, and August 31,
1990”); Greene, supra note 143, at 832 n.45 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)) (noting R
that only four states benefit from any sort of exemption); Linda J. Shorey et al.,
States Utilise Exemption From Sports Betting Ban, WORLD ONLINE GAMBLING LAW REP.
13, 15 (2009) http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/57bbabe4-3286-47d4-9f
d6-58dbad5c8b7d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/38948d21-842e-457c-
9284-6dd6197f14e1/woglrMay09.pdf [https://perma.cc/252F-XJHD] (pointing
out that Delaware, Nevada, Oregon and Montana are the states with PASPA ex-
emptions because they had “sports betting games” when PASPA was passed and so
Congress “carved out exemptions for [them]”).  As such, Delaware can authorize
“parlay wagers or pool betting,” but not “single-game sports betting.”  Steven Strad-
brooke, Delaware Sports Lottery Losing Steam; Pennsylvania Passes Sports Bet Resolution,
CALVINAYRE.COM (Feb. 10, 2016), http://calvinayre.com/2016/02/10/business/
delaware-sports-lottery-losing-steam/ [https://perma.cc/4A9X-BJUU].  DFS likely
falls under the former because participants “wager on more than one outcome”
during contests. Cf. Shorey, supra (explaining difference).  For further discussion
of how DFS contests work, see supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text.  Still, in R
Office of Commissioner of Baseball v. Markell, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Delaware “would violate PASPA” if it “allow[ed] wagering on athletic contests
involving sports beyond the NFL” because Delaware only “‘conducted’” a betting
scheme involving NFL “multi-game parlays” between 1976 and 1990.  OFC
Comm’r Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2009) (referencing time
period set by 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)).  Accordingly, even if Delaware was to regulate
DFS, it could likely only authorize DFS for NFL games, if that. Cf. id. (“Delaware
may . . . institute multi-game (parlay) betting on at least three NFL games, because
such betting is consistent with the scheme to the extent it was conducted in
1976.”). But see id. at 303 (holding that Delaware “cannot effectuate a substantive
change from the scheme that was conducted during the exception period”).  Oth-
erwise, the state would risk violating PASPA. See id. at 300–04 (interpreting how
§ 3704(a) applies to Delaware).
Interestingly, both Delaware and Pennsylvania have made efforts to repeal
PASPA. See Stradbrooke, supra (describing how Pennsylvania introduced “sym-
bolic” bill to abolish PASPA’s sports betting prohibition and explaining how Dela-
ware’s arguments to end PASPA restrictions were refused by federal courts).  New
Jersey has requested the Supreme Court to confirm PASPA’s constitutionality. See
Jacob Gershman, New Jersey Asks Supreme Court to Hear Sports-Betting Case, WALL
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sons” to “operate, advertise, [or] promote” sports wagering, mean-
ing that PASPA is not a saving grace against state intervention for
DFS operators, such as DraftKings and FanDuel.149
Under this interpretation, then, state governments generally
only have two options when it comes to DFS: (1) outlaw it com-
pletely; or (2) let the industry continue to exist unregulated.150
The latter is an unlikely pick for revenue-generating and consumer
protection reasons, however.151
Some commentators have argued that the more recent UIGEA
and its “carve-out” limit the reach of PASPA’s prohibition in that
UIGEA does not consider “participation in any fantasy or simula-
tion sports game” to be a “bet or a wager,” making PASPA inappli-
cable to DFS.152  Yet, other commentators have responded that
UIGEA makes no such supersession.153  They have pointed to the
legislative history of the 2006 Act, and how it states that it should
not be interpreted to limit any other federal gambling law.154  In
addition, UIGEA specifically affirms that “any scheme of a type de-
STREET J. (Oct. 14, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/10/14/new-
jersey-asks-supreme-court-to-hear-sports-betting-case/ (appealing New Jersey fed-
eral court decision and arguing that PASPA violates Tenth Amendment’s “ ‘anti-
commandeering doctrine’”).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (differing unsubstantially from government’s
prohibition); Wallach, supra note 143 (commenting that “persons” will probably be R
interpreted to include businesses as well as individuals).
150. See Sarkar, supra note 143, at 3 (referring to this as “a Hobson’s choice”). R
States that benefit from a PASPA exemption may have more options. See, e.g.,
Moore, supra note 93 (explaining how Nevada can regulate DFS without violating R
PASPA because it had “full sports betting” between January 1, 1976, and August 31,
1990, and therefore can take advantage of the PASPA exemption offered in 28
U.S.C. § 3704(a)).  For further discussion of PASPA exemptions, see supra note
148 and accompanying text. R
151. See Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Legalize and Regulate Fantasy Sports in
New York State, supra note 62 (highlighting motivations for enacting bill). R
152. See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(e)(ix) (2006). See, e.g., Greene, supra note 143, R
at 832–36 (asserting that “UIGEA federally exempts [DFS] from being classified as
. . .  sports gambling” under PASPA); Wallach, supra note 143 (discussing how R
others have taken this stance, but ultimately rejected it).  For further discussion of
the UIGEA “carve-out,” see supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text. R
153. See, e.g., Wallach, supra note 143 (reviewing and applying “interpretive R
principle known as lex posterior derogat legi priori” that requires later enacted statute
to make explicit its repealing or limiting a prior one and because UIGEA contains
no such language, PASPA is not affected by UIGEA); see also Greene, supra note
143, at 833 n.48 (acknowledging that congressman who drafted UIGEA considers R
it “ ‘sheer chutzpah’ for the daily fantasy sites to pretend the law makes them le-
gal’” (citation omitted)).
154. See Wallach, supra note 143 (highlighting UIGEA’s rule of construction, R
31 U.S.C. section 5361(b): “No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as
altering, limiting, or extending any Federal or State law or Tribal-State compact
prohibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.” (em-
phasis omitted)); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 296–97 (pointing out DFS was most R
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scribed in section 3702” of PASPA is a “bet or wager,” further dem-
onstrating how UIGEA is meant to complement PASPA and not
supplant it.155  Former House Representative James Leach, who au-
thored UIGEA, has even indicated that the Act was “never intended
to cover [DFS],” only traditional fantasy sports.156  He only in-
cluded the fantasy sports exemption because other members of
Congress that they would not otherwise vote for UIGEA.157  While
traditional fantasy sports were prevalent by the mid-2000s, DFS was
either unheard of or still very much under development when
UIGEA was enacted, making it improbable that legislators contem-
plated DFS when requesting or creating the exemption.158  Moreo-
ver, in 2015, Representative Leach explained that he intended
UIGEA “to constrain a growing gambling ethos in America that
could bring the casino to the home.”159  The ease of playing DFS
diametrically opposes this goal and further evidences that the
UIGEA exemption is not meant to extend to DFS.160  In addition,
the Congressional Record from shortly after UIGEA’s adoption shows
that legislators voted in favor of the act because they saw “online
gambling [a]s a threat to civic society” and considered UIGEA a foil
to the “gambling lifestyle.”161  The record also reveals an under-
likely not contemplated when drafting UIGEA because of how unknown it was
then).
155. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(c) (referring to PASPA).
156. Josh Israel & Sacha Feinman, The Hot New Form of Fantasy Sports Is Probably
Addictive, Potentially Illegal And Completely Unregulated, THINKPROGRESS (May 7,
2015), https://thinkprogress.org/the-hot-new-form-of-fantasy-sports-is-probably-
addictive-potentially-illegal-and-completely-4c90c89db63b#.pyeol63s1 [https://
perma.cc/W9PW-6P2V] (sharing Leach’s objectives for UIGEA); Shapiro, supra
note 9, at 297 (“There is no evidence that legislators or drafters considered DFS R
. . . it is only clear that [UIGEA] intended to exempt traditional, season-long, fan-
tasy sports.”).
157. See Israel & Fienman, supra note 156 (exposing politics behind passing R
UIGEA).
158. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 296–97 (pointing to lack of proof of DFS’s R
existence when UIGEA was enacted); see also Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka,
Fantasy Sports: One Form of Mainstream Wagering in the United States, 40 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1195, 1198 (2007) (exploring history of fantasy sports and UIGEA’s pre-adop-
tion context); The Evolution of the Daily Fantasy Sports Industry, supra note 1 (noting R
that first major DFS site only went live in 2007).
159. Israel & Feinman, supra note 156 (recalling Representative Leach’s con- R
cern that many Americans were looking to gambling as their means to “obtaining a
big payoff” at the time). But see Gouker, supra note 55 (questioning whether Rep- R
resentative Leach’s opinion matters because “actual language of the law” likely
controls interpretation more).
160. See generally Israel & Feinman, supra note 156 (supplying UIGEA’s cre- R
ators’ perceptions about purpose of UIGEA exemption).
161. 152 CONG. REC. S11045-01 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Kyl), 2006 WL 3330257 (seeing UIGEA’s passing as step towards curtailing Internet
gambling’s availability).
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standing by members of Congress that UIGEA did not modify ex-
isting gambling laws but solely enforced against activities already
considered illegal Internet gambling under state and federal law.162
Accordingly, and in light of no explicit indication that UIGEA
restricts PASPA, state legislatures should be wary of violating this
federal law by enacting legislation legalizing DFS and thereafter
regulating the industry.163  The same is true even when a state au-
thorizes DFS through constitutional amendment.164
With Delaware choosing not to enact DFS legislation, it does
not have to fear such scrutiny.165  On the other hand, New York
does have to worry.166  Such analysis may delay the legislative pro-
gress, but also would lead to a more foolproof regulatory
scheme.167
IV. LOOKING FORWARD—WHAT WILL BE EACH
STATE’S NEXT PLAY?
Because of these lingering federal questions, states need clarifi-
cation on PASPA’s constitutionality and whether UIGEA limits
PASPA’s reach.168  Otherwise, states run the risk of violating federal
162. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. E2152-04 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Bachus), 2006 WL 3540936 (“The new law does not change the legality of any
gambling activity in the United States.”).
163. See Wallach, supra note 143 (warning states to seriously consider PASPA’s R
implications to not “expose their prospective fantasy sports legislation to a future
legal challenge under PASPA”).  The plaintiffs in the lawsuit against Governor
Cuomo and the Commission make this very argument. See Verified Complaint,
supra note 128, at 8, ¶¶ 16–17 (noting federal preemption issue) (citing NCAA v. R
Gov. of N.J., 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 12, 2016)).
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (not distinguishing between whether government
authorizes sports betting through statute or constitutional amendment); Wallach,
supra note 143 (reaching same conclusion); see also Gouker, supra note 112 (dis- R
cussing how one New York DFS bill proposed constitutional amendment to author-
ize DFS, but still recognized that PASPA issue still applies).  “The key point in the
language of this bill is ‘preceded by the elimination of the federal ban on profes-
sional sports wagering.’” Id. (referring to PASPA).
165. See Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra
note 31 (ordering DFS operators to halt contests).  If, in the future, Delaware de- R
cides to regulate DFS, it should take care to not violate its limited PASPA exemp-
tion. See OFC Comm’r Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 300–304 (3d Cir. 2009)
(outlining parameters of Delaware’s exemption).  For further discussion of Dela-
ware’s PASPA exemption, see supra note 148 and accompanying text. R
166. Cf. Verified Complaint, supra note 128, at 8, ¶¶ 16–17 (raising PASPA R
violation because of New York’s DFS legislation).
167. Cf. id.  This lawsuit and the claims the plaintiffs raise should serve as a
cautionary tale to policymakers about PASPA’s applicability in the DFS space.  For
further discussion of the lawsuit, see supra notes 126–130, 163, 166–167 and ac- R
companying text.
168. See Sarkar, supra note 143, at 3 (questioning how PASPA and UIGEA R
interact with each other and with states’ DFS legislations).  For further discussion
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law, putting any legislative effort concerning DFS at risk.169
Whether the federal government will enforce PASPA is another is-
sue.170  With the pending lawsuit in New York, the industry may very
well get the clarification it needs.171
Even if UIGEA provides a DFS carve-out like DraftKings and
FanDuel have contended, there still remains unresolved issues at
the state level.172  New York and Delaware must both resolve
whether they can legalize DFS through statute alone.173  In New
York, the balance tips toward the need for a constitutional amend-
ment as each of its other gambling exceptions was enacted through
amendment.174  The answer is more unclear in Delaware because
the border is hazy between what constitutes a “lottery” as opposed
to “gambling.”175  In either case, if a constitutional amendment is
required, this would delay both states’ timelines in authorizing
of how PASPA and UIGEA interact, see supra notes 143–164 and accompanying R
text.
169. See Wallach, supra note 143 (discussing PASPA’s preemptive authority). R
For further discussion of PASPA, see supra notes 143–164 and accompanying text. R
170. Cf. Verified Complaint, supra note 128, at 8, ¶¶ 16–17 (presenting pri- R
vate citizens’ contention that New York’s DFS legislation violates PASPA).  PASPA
empowers the U.S. Attorney General to sue where a PASPA violation possibly ex-
ists, but the U.S. Attorney has not challenged New York’s DFS legislation since it
became effective in August 2016. See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (1992) (authorizing U.S.
Attorney General with power to commence suit); see also Governor Cuomo Signs Legis-
lation to Legalize and Regulate Fantasy Sports in New York State, supra note 62 (noting R
when DFS bill became effective in New York).
171. See generally Karlin, supra note 127 (overviewing New York lawsuit); see R
also supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing how New Jersey is seeking R
United States Supreme Court’s review of PASPA’s constitutionality).
172. See, e.g., NYAG Press Release, supra note 27 (stating that DFS is “illegal R
gambling” under New York state law); Online Fantasy Sports Contests for Money Asked
to Cease in Delaware, supra note 31 (affirming DFS’s illegality because Delaware legis- R
lation has yet to legalize it); see also People of New York v. FanDuel, Inc., No.
453056/15, 2015 WL 8490461, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015) (reviewing
UIGEA defense).
173. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 (banning gambling generally, but providing
exceptions); DEL. CONST. art. II, § 17 (allowing only few forms gambling and out-
lawing all other forms).  For further discussion of whether New York or Delaware
would require a constitutional amendment to legalize DFS, see supra notes 93–142 R
and accompanying text.
174. See Wallach, supra note 93 (underscoring this history); Liebman, supra R
note 111 (“Since 1894, the State Constitution has had a specific provision banning R
all forms of gambling[, but it] has been amended to provide exceptions to the
gambling ban.”).  For further discussion of New York’s constitution, see supra notes
41–43, 93–103, and 111–128 and accompanying text. R
175. See DEL. CONST. art. II, § 17 (authorizing “[l]otteries under State con-
trol”).  For further discussion explaining how the Delaware Constitution leaves
room that gambling may fall under umbrella term “lottery,” see supra notes
132–138 and accompanying text. R
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DFS.176  The consequences in New York would be more devastating
because DFS has recently resumed there.177
In light of all these complications, it may be best for the federal
government to intervene and amend PASPA to allow states to au-
thorize and regulate DFS, directly or indirectly.178  The government
could stipulate, however, that the Federal Trade Commission has
certain overseeing abilities over the state regulatory body in charge
of enforcing the DFS laws.179  It could also require a payment of a
federal tax.180  This approach should be appealing to federal legis-
lators as they can get ahead of any unfavorable ruling regarding
PASPA’s applicability to DFS and capitalize from this booming in-
dustry.181  There have already been a few congressional discussions
176. See N.Y. CONST., art. XIX, § 1; DEL. CONST. art XVI, § 1(laying out re-
quirements for constitutional amendment).  For further discussion for how the
New York Constitution can be amended, see supra notes 113–125 and accompany- R
ing text.  For further discussion for how the Delaware Constitution can be
amended, see supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text. R
177. See Gouker, supra note 63 (reporting on DraftKings’ and FanDuel’s re- R
turn to New York); see also New York Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP., http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/ny/ [https://perma.cc/K7B4-7RWH] (last visited Oct.
27, 2016) (“If forced to stay out of NY indefinitely, it is a major setback in terms of
revenue and liquidity for both FanDuel and DraftKings. New York is believed to be
the second largest state in terms of both revenue and users for the two sites.”).
178. See Brian Pempus, Federal Government to Consider Legalizing Sports Betting,
CARD PLAYER (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-news/20945-fed-
eral-government-to-consider-legalizing-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/3NKT-
WTAY] (covering how New Jersey congressman will introduce “legislation to estab-
lish federal regulation on sports betting”); Daniel Wallach, How to Legalize Sports
Betting, DEADSPIN (Aug. 31, 2016, 4:30 PM), http://deadspin.com/how-to-legalize-
sports-betting-1786002079 [https://perma.cc/5ZDU-9MXY] (pointing out how
PASPA amendment may only happen years from now, but may happen sooner
because of rise in DFS legislation and litigation); see also Sarkar, supra note 143, at 3 R
(proposing federal framework where Federal Trade Commission will be charged
with regulating DFS); David Purdum & Ryan Rodenberg, Future of Sports Betting:
The Marketplace, ESPN (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/
17892685/the-future-sports-betting-how-sports-betting-legalized-united-states-the-
marketplace-look-like [https://perma.cc/FA38-AN8V] (sharing notion that wagers
at or below $1000 should be exempt from PASPA regulation because “a panel of
judges [has opined] that [this] wouldn’t run afoul of the federal ban”).
179. See generally Sarkar, supra note 143, at 3 (“[T]he [FTC is] the only regula- R
tor with the dual mission to protect consumers and promote competition.”). See
also Purdum & Rodenberg, supra note 178 (including PASPA exception suggestion R
in which case there would be no federal oversight).  For further discussion of this
suggested exception, see supra note 178 and accompanying text. R
180. Cf. N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1407 (McKinney 2016)
(implementing tax payment to New York); H.B. 444, supra note 138, § 4868 (re- R
quiring tax to Delaware).
181. See, e.g., NCAA v. Gov. of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016), petition
for cert. filed (Aug. 12, 2016) (ruling on PASPA’s constitutionality as applied to re-
stricting states’ power to authorize DFS and holding that PASPA “does not uncon-
stitutionally commandeer” states); see also Greene, supra note 143, at 833–34 R
(arguing that UIGEA creates exception from PASPA for DFS).
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about federal involvement in regulating DFS, but none has resulted
in legislative development.182  The potential DraftKings and
FanDuel merger may just give DFS the traction it needs to become
a prioritized item in Congress.183  Still, Congress should continue to
familiarize itself with DFS and meet with key “stakeholders,” that is,
representatives from DraftKings and FanDuel as well as representa-
tives from national sports leagues, before forming a “federal
framework.”184
There is, however, resistance to the idea of federal interven-
tion.185  Some scholars insist that DFS regulation should remain
182. See David Purdum, Congress Reviewing ‘Obsolete’ Federal Gambling Laws, to
Introduce New Legislation, ESPN (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/
story/_/id/17848529/congressional-committee-reviews-federal-gambling-laws-
plans-introduce-new-legislation [https://perma.cc/ED58-BQ3C] (reporting that
“comprehensive legislation” is being planned to address DFS along with other
forms of sports betting, but such legislation has not yet been developed); Dustin
Gouker, After Hearing, Don’t Expect Congress to Get Involved with Daily Fantasy Sports,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 11, 2016, 9:49 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/
9985/congress-and-action-on-daily-fantasy-sports/ [https://perma.cc/ZYB2-
DCG2] (noting that there is “almost certainly no federal action” resulting from
May 2016 meeting of House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and
Trade on DFS).  Congress seems to be reviewing federal gambling laws, including
PASPA and UIGEA, to “harmonize” them through new legislation. See Purdum,
supra (discussing push to assess these laws because of DFS’s “rise” in popularity and
controversy).
183. See generally Dustin Gouker, Congressional Committee to Tackle US Sports Bet-
ting: What it Means and What’s Next, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Oct. 21, 2016, 10:44 AM),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11871/congressional-committee-to-tackle-us-
sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/ZYB2-DCG2] (noting need for “momentum”);
Edelman, supra note 6 (predicting that Department of Justice and FTC may object R
to merger on antitrust grounds).  This scrutiny may just put DFS firmly within Con-
gress’s radar. See generally id. (discussing regulatory challenges merger will face);
Purdum, supra note 182 (covering how there was push within Congress to review R
federal gambling laws around time merger announced).  For further discussion of
DraftKings’ and FanDuel’s merger, see supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. R
184. See Dustin Gouker, Former NBA Commissioner David Stern Calls for Legal US
Sports Betting at Vegas Gaming Conference, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 29, 2016, 1:48
PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11695/former-nba-commissioner-david-
stern/ [https://perma.cc/EJA7-GALH] (sharing David Stern’s, former National
Basketball Association Commissioner, thoughts on federal role in DFS regulation).
185. See generally Steven Titch & Michelle Minton, Game Changer: Rethinking
Online Gambling Regulation in the Age of Daily Fantasy Sports, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE
INST. (2016), available at https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Steven%20Titch%20
and%20Michelle%20Minton%20-%20Game%20Changer.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N6XX-4XVN] (reasoning that any federal oversight should be limited).  Specifi-
cally, Titch and Minton contend that there should no federal involvement “beyond
[the] enforcement of existing federal laws that apply to all other businesses, such
as tax responsibility, antitrust rules, and other economic regulations” because
while the Internet is “inherently interstate,” technology can confine online gam-
bling within individual states. Id. at 9 (reviewing how certain states have effectively
“fenced in” their legalization of online gambling and federal government has not
intervened); see also Darren Heitner, Leave Daily Fantasy Sports Regulation to the
States, FORBES (May 10, 2016, 6:30 AM), (summarizing Titch and Minton’s report);
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solely with the states because regulating gambling has traditionally
been a “state-level responsibility.”186  They argue that federal inter-
vention would just mean “greater regulation . . . overall” and lead to
a confusing dual regulatory infrastructure.187  Still, fifty different
approaches to regulating DFS with no central oversight does not
seem to be a suitable alternative or all that sustainable.188
Over the past few years, the DFS industry, particularly DraftK-
ings and FanDuel, has had to face the reality that it will no longer
thrive in an unregulated market.189  That fantasy is long gone.190
DFS’s best case scenario is to be legalized and regulated, paying
taxes to operate.191  Where they were once fierce competitors, trail-
blazing a new way to play fantasy sports, the now merging DraftK-
ings and FanDuel are knee-deep in legal battles and legal fees just
trying to survive.192  What a bleak new world.
Roni Mathew*
Jim Pagels, Should Daily Fantasy Sports Be Regulated by the Government?, REASON.COM
(Oct. 26, 2015), http://reason.com/archives/2015/10/26/let-the-free-market-
give-fantasy-sports/ (criticizing “sudden consumer protection watchfulness” of DFS
industry and how regulatory compliance costs will likely “lower payouts” that may
then lead to “underground . . . daily fantasy games”).
186. See Titch & Minton, supra note 185, at 20 (noting PASPA as exception). R
187. See id. (remarking that federal regulations would be in addition to state
laws).
188. See Gouker, supra note 184 (including Stern’s “disdain” for “state-by-state R
approach,” that “50 different governmental bodies could be involved” and how
national sports leagues will probably not support this method).
189. See, e.g., Gouker, supra note 63 (describing legislation enacted in New R
York and permits and restrictions thereunder); Online Fantasy Sports Contests for
Money Asked to Cease in Delaware, supra note 31 (outlawing DFS entirely).  For fur- R
ther discussion of the DFS industry becoming regulated, see supra notes 17–92 and R
accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Drape & Williams, supra note 17 (reporting DFS industry’s in-
sider trading scandal and highlighting concerns for heightened protections).  For
further discussion of this DFS scandal and its aftermath, see supra notes 17–31 and R
accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., N.Y. RAC. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW § 1407 (McKinney
2016) (stating that “for the privilege” of operating DFS contests in New York, DFS
operators must pay fifteen percent tax).  For further discussion of DFS legislation
in play in New York, see supra notes 65–79 and accompanying text. R
192. See Berzon, supra note 4 (discussing merger and impact of legal chal- R
lenges on DraftKings’ and FanDuel’s valuations).  For further discussion of the
merger, see supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, 2017;
B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2012.  Jesus, I love you.  For the past two years, my
motto has been, “By your grace and for your glory,” and this article is a testament
to your sovereignty over my life.  I thank my family and friends for supporting me
through this process, especially Cassie, Mark, and Alex.  I could not have done this
without your friendships.  To each of my editors along the way, you have been
wonderful and I am grateful for all of your help.
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